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Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children in
Custody, Visitation and Child Protection Proceedings
Martin Guggenheim*
"Although unwanted medical care is recognized to be
potentially harmful, the imposition of legal care for a child is
presumed to be benign.
OPENING REMARKS DELIVERED AT THE ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE
LEGAL REPRESENTATION OF CHILDREN CONFERENCE**

I am honored to be here tonight and to have the privilege to start this
magnificent conference on representing children. It is a particular
honor for me because the people in the room include some of the
leading practitioners and thinkers in the field, and I am thrilled to have
the opportunity to share with you some of my thoughts about our
work.
It is also an honor to be at this particular school, because this is the
only law school in the country dedicated to my life's work. By its
very existence, Loyola's CIVITAS Child Law Center acknowledges
the central importance of children in our lives, and a concentrated
study of the multifarious ways the law impacts the well-being of
children deserves the careful attention it receives, and receives only, at
this institution.
I also feel privileged in being here to talk about the intricate subject
of representing children because there is no topic that is more
intriguing to me. I hope to begin this Conference by providing a brief
history of the development of the norms and standards for representing
children in various legal proceedings, including how we got to where
we are now and where I think we are headed. In doing so, I hope to
* Professor of Clinical Law; Director, Clinical and Advocacy Programs, New York
University School of Law. I wish to thank Eric Dorsch of the New York University class
of 1998 for his extremely valuable research assistance and to gratefully acknowledge the
financial support from the Filomen D'Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund at
New York University School of Law.
**
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ErAL., IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 117 (1986).
** * Professor Guggenheim delivered the keynote speech at the Ethical Issues in the
Legal Representation of Children Conference hosted by Loyola University Chicago
School of Law's CIVITAS ChildLaw Center on April 10-12, 1997. This Article is an
expanded version of Professor Guggenheim's keynote speech.
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set the stage for what should be a very important day and a half
beginning tomorrow morning, when you get the opportunity to meet in
groups and begin the crucial work of developing standards for
representing children applicable to Illinois.
PREAMBLE
In a new effort to find permanent adoptive homes for newborn
African-Americans in Massachusetts, a foster care agency decided to
place a three-day-old African-American girl named Lesley with a
Caucasiancouple. The case is before the Boston Juvenile Court and it
has been the object of extended discussion in the Boston media. The
judge assigned to decide the case wants to ensure that Lesley is
representedby the best lawyer the city has to offer.
The judge does a computer search for the names of prominent
members of the Boston Bar who are committed to the public interest
and have a keen interest in the well being of children. Two names rise
to the top of the list: Elizabeth Bartholet,a professor of law at Harvard
Law School, and Ruth-Arlene Howe, a professor of law at Boston
College School of Law. Professor Bartholet is an eloquent
spokesperson for encouraging and expanding the number and
opportunities of transracialadoptions.' Professor Howe disagrees
with this position, believing that it is not necessarily in the best
interests of African-American children to make it easierfor them to be
adopted by white couples.2
If word leaked before the judge made the appointment that she was
going to select one or the other of these two highly qualified lawyers to
represent Lesley, the children's rights advocacy network that wants
more transracialadoptions would urge the appointment of Professor
Bartholet. Those advocates less inclined towards transracialadoptions
would urge the appointment of ProfessorHowe.
The question that naturally arises is whether we want a legal
services delivery system in which anyone should care which qualified
lawyer happened to be assigned to represent a child? In a rational
system of law it ought to make no difference to the outcome whether
ProfessorBartholet or ProfessorHowe were asked to assist the court
in determining Lesley's best interests.

1. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet,
Race Matching in Adoption, 139 U.
2. See, e.g., Ruth-Arlene W.
Controversy, DUKE J. GENDER L. &

Where Do Black Children Belong? The Politics of
PA. L. REV. 1163 (1991).
Howe, Redefining the Transracial Adoption
POL'Y, Spring 1995, at 131.
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Once we agree that it should not matter whether ProfessorBartholet
or ProfessorHowe is assigned to represent Lesley, it becomes clear
that this necessarilyplaces significant limitations on the various actions
these lawyers would be permitted to take in the course of the
representation. If we allowed unrestrainedprofessional behavior in
the representationof Lesley, ProfessorBartholet would seek to retain
expert opinion that transracialadoptions are goodfor children (and
make good public policy in the bargain). Professor Bartholet would
also undoubtedly prepare a powerful brief in support of the adoption
going forward. In contrast, Professor Howe would undertake the
identical tasks to demonstrate why the adoption should be denied (and
why it makes bad policy to encourage such adoptions).
In other words, if we allowed unrestrainedprofessional behavior,
the court would actually be inviting a member of the bar to advocate
for a particularposition, completely leaving the choice of thatposition
to the lawyer. No rationalsystem should want random argument of
this kind. Randomness of this sort, when it potentially affects the
outcome, is the antithesis of law. In an intelligent system, both
Professors Bartholet and Howe should be expected to perform a
similar role with as little variation as possible being tolerated that
derives from theirpersonalvalues or opinions.
Until very recently, it may have greatly mattered what particular
views the attorney assigned to representa child happened to possess.
As this Article will indicate, however, those days appear to be behind
us as a growing consensus of scholarsand practitionersincreasingly
insist that personality,personal opinions, values, and beliefs should
play as small a role as possible in carrying out the responsibilitiesof
representinga child in a legal proceeding.

I. INTRODUCTION
Nearly everyone would identify 1967 as the most important year in
the history of counsel for children in the United States. Starting a
process that has been evolving ever since, in that year the Supreme
Court held that children whose freedom could be curtailed in
delinquency proceedings have the right to court-assigned counsel.3
Prior to 1967, children were rarely represented by counsel in American
courts. 4
Since the Court's decision in In re Gault,5 many
3. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
4. A very few states recognized the right to court-assigned counsel in delinquency
proceedings, at least in limited circumstances, prior to Gault. These states were
California, Minnesota, New York, and the District of Columbia. See id. at 37 n.63.
5. Id.
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commentators have recommended the appointment of lawyers to
represent children in a wide variety of proceedings, 6 and courts and
legislatures have dramatically expanded the circumstances in which
lawyers for children are assigned. 7 As a result, today lawyers
commonly represent children in a variety of legal matters, including
child protection, custody, and visitation proceedings.
If 1967 serves as the field's most important year, the past three
years should be regarded as the most active years in the area of legal
representation of children. There has been more ferment during 19951997 than at any other time in American history. This activity includes
the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers' ("AAML")8 and the
American Bar Association's ("ABA") drafting of model standards for
representing children. The ABA recently contributed two standards:
one for representing children in neglect, abuse, and termination of
parental rights cases, 9 and a second for representing children in
custody and visitation cases, the latter developed with the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges ("NCJFCJ").'°
In the midst of these important contributions, in December 1995,
Fordham University Law School hosted a national conference on
representing children," resulting in the Fordham Law Review's
publication of a special issue discussing ethical issues in the legal
representation of children.' 2 The Conference was sponsored by
6. See Peter Margulies, The Lawyer as Caregiver: Child Client's Competence in
Context, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1473, 1473 n.1 (1996) (listing examples of some of the
many articles on representing children published since 1976).
7. See Linda D. Elrod, Counselfor the Child in Custody Disputes: The Time is Now,
26 FAM. L.Q. 53, 53 (1992).
8. See Representing Children: Standards for Attorneys and GuardiansAd Litem in
Custody or Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 1 (1995)
[hereinafter AAML Standards]. I served as the reporter for these standards.
9. See Linda Elrod, et al., Representing Children Standards of Practice Committee,
Proposed Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent Children in Abuse and
Neglect Cases, 29 FAM. L.Q. 375 (1995) [hereinafter Standards of Practice] (addressing
appointed counsel's specific responsibilities in child abuse and neglect cases and
providing standards for judges and judicial administrations to ensure quality
representation); see also infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
10. See American Bar Association & National Council of Juvenile and Family Court
Judges, Principles for Appointment of Representatives for Children in Custody and
Visitation Proceedings, June 30, 1997 (on file with the author) [hereinafter Principles].
The National Council has formally approved the principles. As of this writing, the
Principles have not been approved by the American Bar Association. I served as a
member of the working group that recommended the Principles, and as a member of the
drafting committee.
11. Fordham University School of Law, Conference on Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, December 1-3, 1995.
12. Special Issue, Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, 64
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thirteen organizations that constitute virtually the entire organized bar
that represents children. 13 The Fordham Conference produced a
remarkably clear consensus among the community of scholars and
practitioners working in the field, on the role and purpose of counsel
for children. 14 Although differences of opinion still exist,' 5 the
consensus evidences an understanding among practitioners and
scholars on several fundamental points. This general understanding
serves as a useful opportunity to reconsider the basic principles behind
providing lawyers for children. This Article will explore these basic
principles. 16 In addition, this Article will encourage an even more
basic reconsideration of the necessity for and wisdom of using lawyers
for children now that the practicing bar has reached agreement on the
role of such lawyers.' 7
Historically, the legal representation of children has developed
differently than one would expect. Logically, one ought to determine
first why children should be represented by a lawyer, which would
include defining precisely the particular tasks desired of the child's
lawyer before reaching the question of when counsel should be
appointed. However, the history of appointing counsel for children
has taken a very different route, an examination of which reveals two
major developmental phases.
Phase One can be characterized principally by the expansion of
circumstances that require the representation of children. In the years
following Gault, courts frequently proclaimed the right of children to
representation, but provided remarkably little explanation regarding the
reasons or the purpose for the representation. 8 Following this lead,
many commentators sought to expand the child's right to
representation, but these commentators focused more on the right to
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281 (1996)

[hereinafter Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of

Children].
13. See Bruce A. Green & Bernardine Dohrn, Foreword: Children and the Ethical
Practice of Law, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1283 n.7 (1996).
14. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing the consensus reached
regarding the appropriate role for legal representatives of children).
15. See infra note 65-66 and accompanying text (noting spectrum of opinions which
persist).
16. See infra Part II (discussing the rationale for appointing counsel for children and
resulting duties).
17. See infra Part IV.A.
18. See, e.g., In re T.M.H., 613 P.2d 468, 471 (Okla. 1980) (holding that
independent counsel for children must be appointed in cases regarding termination of
parental rights due to conflicting interests of child, parent, and State); In re Child X, 617
P.2d 1078, 1078-79 (Wyo. 1980) (remanding case where court failed to appoint an
attorney to represent child in an abuse and neglect case as required by statute).
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representation rather than on the lawyer's role when representing
children.' 9
In contrast to Phase One, a much more careful attention to the role
of counsel characterizes Phase Two. This phase includes an on-going
debate in the literature and the development of standards of
representation by commentators and professional organizations.20
Now that Phase Two is drawing to a close, this Article intends to
initiate discussions for a Phase Three, and re-evaluates whether and
when lawyers should be appointed to represent children. Because a
modicum of agreement has been achieved as to why courts should
appoint lawyers to represent children and what the lawyer's role is
once appointed, legislatures and judges now need to reconsider when
to appoint such lawyers.2
One reason courts have felt little need to worry about appointing
counsel for children, as this Article's epigraph asserts, is that most
judges presume the imposition of legal care is benign.22 But, as courts
become increasingly aware of the possible subversion of the
substantive law resulting from universal appointment of counsel for
children, a third phase of development should result where courts will
be willing to spend more time examining this underlying presumption.

19. See, e.g., Howard A. Davidson, The Child's Right to be Heard and Represented in
Judicial Proceedings, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 255, 256 (1991) (discussing a child's right to
independent counsel in proceedings concerning delinquency, child custody, abuse,
neglect, paternity determination, child support, adoption, psychiatric evaluation and
commission, and public school actions); Patricia M. Wald, The Kindness of Strangers,

1477, 1489-91 (1988) (reviewing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., IN THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986)); Jennifer Bellah, Comment, Appointing Counselfor the
Child in Actions to Terminate ParentalRights, 70 CAL. L. REV. 481, 507-08 (1982)
97 YALE L.J.

(concluding that separate counsel should be appointed at child's request in cases
regarding termination of parental rights in addition to requiring that counsel be
appointed when the State's or parent's interests conflict with the child's interests).
20. See, e.g., Leonard P. Edwards & Inger J. Sagatun, Who Speaks for the Child?, 2 U.
CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 67 (1995); Jinanne S.J. Elder, The Role of Counsel for
Children: A Proposalfor Addressing a Troubling Question, 35 BOST. B.J. 6 (1991);
Kevin M. Ryan, Reforming Model Rule 1.6: A Brief Essay From the Crossroads of
Ethics and Conscience, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2065 (1996).
21. See infra Part II (discussing typical cases in which counsel is appointed to
represent children).
22. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 780 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (without
addressing the role of counsel, holding that children must be represented in neglect
proceedings); In re Orlando F., 351 N.E.2d 711, 716-17 (N.Y. 1976) (without addressing
the role of counsel, holding children must be represented in termination of parental
rights proceedings).
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THE REMARKABLE ABSENCE OF MEANINGFUL GUIDANCE FROM
LEGISLATURES AND COURTS

Despite widespread increase in the use of lawyers to represent
children, courts have been surprisingly unreflective about their
expectations of lawyers once such lawyers are appointed to represent
children. For the most part, courts and legislatures have abdicated
their responsibilities to the practicing bar and to litigants by failing to
clearly identify permissible and impermissible actions by lawyers for
children when performing their duties. A 1992 report from the Family
Law Section to the ABA House of Delegates summarized this
phenomenon as follows:
The duties and ethical responsibilities of lawyers performing the
role of counsel or guardian ad litem for a child in state-initiated
child protective cases, or parent-initiated custody or visitation
litigation, have rarely been adequately described by any State
laws, court rules, or bar association opinions. This has resulted
in a great deal of role confusion for those who provide this
difficult and important representation.23
A. Child ProtectionProceedings
Every state requires that some kind of adult represent children when
their parents or guardians are respondents in local child protection
proceedings. 24 However, both the title and the expected duties of this
representative vary widely throughout the United States.25 Moreover,
even among different jurisdictions that use the same title for such a
representative, the jurisdictions lack a common understanding of the
representative's duties. Jean Koh Peters, who completed a national
survey of representation for children in child protection proceedings,
recently made the following description of the haphazard national
23. Kenneth G. Raggio, Report to the House of Delegates, I 10A A.B.A. SEC. FAM. L.
2, 5 (1992). The Report also added:
Many attorneys who are appointed to serve [as representatives for children ...
are often confused about their responsibilities to either advocate for the
expressed wishes of the child or for the best interests of the child as the
attorney perceives it. . . . They often wonder whether or not to aggressively
challenge the positions of other parties to the litigation. Finally, they are
often confused about whether to defer to the judgments of social workers and
other child welfare agency personnel and when to seek out other, independent
expert opinions.
Id. at 4.
24. See JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:
ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS § 2-3(b), at 24-26 (1997).
25. Examples of these titles include: "counsel," "guardian ad litem," and "Court
Appointed Special Advocate."
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system: "If our survey revealed one thing, it was chaos. We joked in
our office that the 'fifty-plus state' survey revealed fifty-six state
'
systems for representing children in child-protective proceedings."26
In one sense, Congress federalized this system by enacting the
Child Abuse Protection and Treatment Act of 1974 ("CAPTA"), which
requires representation of a child's interests and rights in all child
protection proceedings.2 7 This federalization, however, is misleading
because Congress leaves the determinations of the representative's
functions entirely to the states.2" Presently, virtually no two states
have identical understandings of the role and purpose of the child's
representative. According to Professor Peters,
even though forty-six states use the term guardian ad litem...
[niothing guarantees that a guardian ad litem in one state would
play the same role as a guardian ad litem in the next state or
even that two guardians ad litem in the same state but different
counties would play the roles similarly. Frankly, there is not
even a guarantee that the same guardian ad29litem would
represent two similarly situated children similarly!
The same observation holds true with regard to all other terms
acknowledging a child's representative. 30 Even under a precise term
such as "counsel," the desired role of the lawyer representing a child
encounters disagreement between members of the bar in the same
jurisdiction, between judges in the same jurisdiction, or, perhaps most
seriously, between the judge appointing the "counsel" and the
appointed lawyer. As Professor Peters concludes, "in almost any state
...one will encounter within the state a deep disagreement about the
3
role of the child's lawyer." '
The most common instruction given to representatives of children in
child protection proceedings is that they must "represent," or "protect"
the child's "interests" or "best interests. 32 An instruction to lawyers
26. PETERS, supra note 24, § 2-3(b), at 26.
27. See 45 C.F.R. § 1340.14 (1996). CAPTA requires all states, in child protection
proceedings, to "insure the appointment of a guardian ad litem or other individual whom
the State recognizes as fulfilling the same functions as a guardian ad litem, to represent
and protect the rights and best interests of the child." Id. § 1340.14(g) (italics added).
28. See id.
29. PETERS, supra note 24, § 2-3(b), at 32 n,17.
30. See supra notes 24, 26-27.
3 1. PETERS, supra note 24, § 2-3(b), at 33.
32. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 587-34 (Michie 1997) (requiring that a
guardian ad litem."shall protect the best interests of the child..."); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
260.155(4) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that a guardian ad litem shall advocate and
monitor the child's best interests); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-303 (1997) (requiring
guardians ad litem to represent the best interests of the child).

1998]

Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children

307

to act in accordance with the child's best interests does not provide
counsel with a meaningful mandate or clearly defined standards of
conduct. Such a vague instruction to counsel merely invites
inconsistent behavior, and virtually ensures non-uniformity of
professional conduct. As Hillary Rodham Clinton wrote, the "best
interests standard . ... is not properly a standard. Instead, it is a
rationalization by decision-makers justifying their judgments about a
child's future, like an empty
vessel into which adult perceptions and
33
prejudices are poured.,
B. Custody and Visitation Proceedings
A comparable level of chaos exists in the matrimonial field.3 4
Remarkably, legislatures have said little to nothing about either the
reasons to provide children with legal representation in custody or
visitation proceedings arising out of divorce, or the duties associated
with such representation. Although several states have established
criteria setting forth when legal appointments should be made,35 only
33. Hillary Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARV. EDUC. REV. 487, 513 (1973).
34. See infra part 11.B.
35. At least five states mandate the appointment of counsel after meeting certain
criteria. Florida, Minnesota, Missouri, South Dakota, and Tennessee require the
appointment of a guardian ad litem or an attorney in custody and visitation proceedings
involving allegations of abuse or neglect. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.401 (West Supp.
1997) (requiring that the court appoint a guardian ad litem for the child in custody and
visitation cases involving allegations of abuse or neglect verified and determined by the
court to be well-founded); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.165(20) (West Supp. 1997) (requiring
appointment of guardian ad litem in custody or visitation rights cases where court
suspects child abuse or neglect); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.423(1) (West 1997) (providing
that the court shall appoint a guardian ad litem when child abuse or neglect is alleged);
S.D. Codified Laws § 25-4-45.4 (Michie 1997) (providing that court may appoint
counsel for a child in divorce or custody proceedings where child abuse or neglect is
alleged); TENN. CT. R. ANN. of JUV. PROC. R. 37 (requiring appointment of guardian ad
litem where the parent or other guardian is absent, has conflicting interests, or where
child abuse or neglect is alleged). Three other states do not set forth criteria mandating
the appointment of counsel, but they do articulate circumstances requiring appointment
of counsel. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.425(3) (Supp. 1996) (requiring appointment
of counsel if one or more of the children so request); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.15, § 594(b)
(1997) (requiring appointment of counsel whenever a child is called as a witness in a
custody, visitation, or child support proceeding); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (1) (West
1997) (requiring counsel for children in all contested custody proceedings).
Some other states provide only limited guidance where courts have the discretion to
make an appointment. Arkansas, for example, authorizes an appointment "where the
evidence is either nonexistent or inadequate to determine the comparative fitness of the
parents and to determine where the best interests of the child lie, or in cases where it is
apparent that the dispute is centered on the desires of the parents rather than the best
interests of the child." Kimmons v. Kimmons, 613 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Ark. Ct. App.
1981). In contrast, Maryland prohibits the appointment of counsel over the objection
of the parties, unless there are contested issues. See Van Schaik v. Van Schaik, 603

308

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

about a dozen jurisdictions provide any guidance to these
representatives regarding their duties once assigned to a case. 6 Of this
number, only very few jurisdictions specifically describe the tasks
expected of the child's legal representative. 37 Instead, most
jurisdictions that even bother to discuss the role of a child's
representative, including New Mexico, Virginia, and Wisconsin, do
little more than instruct the representative to "exercise his best
professional judgment on what disposition would further the best
interests of the child. 38
Just as the legislatures have provided little guidance in defining the
representative's role, courts have not attempted to resolve these
existing inconsistencies. Generally, courts have not been called upon
to define or clarify the roles of children's legal representatives, and
have remained startlingly silent even on the rare occasions when asked
to explain the reason for appointing a lawyer. The Supreme Court of
Connecticut serves as a prominent example of such silence. In Knock
v. Knock, 39 an appeal brought by a father and child in a custody case
raised the claim that the trial judge committed reversible error by
A.2d 908, 912 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1992).
36. These jurisdictions include Colorado, Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
New Hampshire, New Mexico, South Carolina, Virginia and Wisconsin. See COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10-116 (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.403 (West Supp.
1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4005 (West 1964 & Supp. 1997); MASS. ANN.
LAWS ch. 119, § 55 (Law. Co-op. 1997); Mo. ANN.. STAT. § 452.423 (West Supp.
1995); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 464A:41 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-1-7 (Michie
Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-1570 (Law. Co-op. 1997); VA SUP. CT. R. 8:6,
WIS. STAT. ANN. 767.045(4) (West Supp. 1997).
37. Colorado, for example, requires guardians ad litem to present all available
evidence concerning the child's best interests. See In re Marriage of Barnthouse, 765
P.2d 610, 612 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988). Florida law sets forth a long list of duties of
guardians ad litem, including investigating, interviewing, petitioning the court to
inspect records, requesting the court to order medical examinations, assisting the court
in obtaining impartial expert examinations, making recommendations, filing
pleadings, motions, or petitions, participating in depositions and hearings, and
compelling the attendance of witnesses. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.403 (West Supp.
1997). Similarly, in Maine, the duties of guardians ad litem are "to evaluate the parties,
their children, and any other appropriate individuals and to provide a report and
recommendations to the Court as to an appropriate disposition of the parental rights and
responsibilities" regarding the child. Gerber v. Peters, 584 A.2d 605, 606 (Me. 1990).
38. Collins v. Tabet, 806 P.2d 40, 50 (N.M. 1991) (quoting Veazey v. Veazey, 560
P.2d 382 (Alaska 1977)). See also VA. Sup. Cr. R. 8:6 (instructing guardians ad litem to
"vigorously represent the child, fully protecting the child's best interests and welfare,"
and to "advise the court of the wishes of the child in any case where the wishes of the
child conflict with the opinion of the guardian ad litem as to what is in the child's
interest and welfare"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.045 (4) (West 1993) (providing that
guardians shall act "independently," and shall "consider, but not be bound by, the
wishes of the minor child or the positions of others as to the best interests").
39. 621 A.2d 267 (Conn. 1993).
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admonishing the child's lawyer for being too active an advocate at
trial.' As the supreme court described:
During the trial, counsel for the child examined witnesses, made
evidentiary objections and otherwise participated in the court
proceedings. On the fifth day of trial, as a result of an
evidentiary objection by counsel for the minor child, a colloquy
took place on the record between the court and counsel relating
to the role of counsel for the minor child.
In the course of that exchange the court admonished the child's
attorney for making evidentiary objections that the court viewed
as favoring the [father's] position. Specifically, the court
discouraged the child's attorney from raising objections and
suggested that the child's attorney should wait for someone else
to raise such objections. The court accused the counsel for the
child of improperly "prejudging" the case. The court also
admonished counsel for "making up her mind before hearing
all the evidence" and suggested that she should properly remain
neutral throughout the trial and, after hearing all the evidence,
make a recommendation to the court at the end of the
proceedings. Finally, the court indicated that counsel's actions
would influence the court and diminish the weight given by the
court to counsel's position. 4 '
On appeal, the father and child argued that the undisguised threat that
any further advocacy by counsel would result in the court giving
"diminish[ed]" weight to counsel's position constituted impermissible
judicial bias.42 Although the Connecticut Supreme Court agreed that
the trial court's remark was of "questionable propriety,"'4 3 it held that
the father and child failed to demonstrate any prejudice resulting from
the trial court's actions.'
The Knock Court acknowledged that the state legislature failed to
inform lawyers and judges of their expectations of those assigned to
represent children.45 In an understatement, the court further
"recognize[d] that representing a child creates practical problems for an
attorney and that this important issue, at some point, needs to be
40. See id. at 275. In a marital dissolution case, the trial court awarded custody of the
minor child to the wife. See id. at 270. The father appealed, claiming that the trial
court's award of custody to the wife was improper. See id. at 269.
41. Id. at 275.
42. Id. at 276.
43. Id.
44. See id.
45. See id. (stating that, "the legislature has not delineated, nor has this Court yet
been presented with the opportunity to delineate, the obligations and limitations of the
role of counsel for a minor child").
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addressed."'46 Nonetheless, the court refused to state what it expects
from lawyers representing children, reasoning that "courts may not be
used as a vehicle to obtain judicial opinions upon points of law if no
actual and existing controversy exists" 47
Astonishingly, the Connecticut Supreme Court believes, on the one
hand, that it is acceptable to set lawyers loose to represent children
and, on the other, that it is unimportant to tell those lawyers what is
expected of them. The Connecticut Supreme Court appears content
knowing that lawyers throughout the state are "representing" children
absent any guidance, and acting strictly in accordance with their own
perception of their roles. Furthermore, it is almost beyond
comprehension that a court would regard telling lawyers their duties in
advance of an assignment to be an "advisory opinion. ' 48
In the absence of a clear mandate from courts or legislatures on the
role of a child's legal representative, appeals courts, trial courts, and
attorneys, acting separately, have created a hodgepodge of methods
and goals for representing children.49 An unfortunate result of this
hodgepodge is that the behavior of attorneys remains unpredictable
with individual attorneys applying their own personal set of values to
determine the course of action in each case. 5°
III. A STRONG CONSENSUS ON REPRESENTING CHILDREN
EMERGES

Into this abyss, the organized Bar has now stepped to resolve the
vagaries of the role of a child's representative. The Bar of children's
lawyers is comprised of many factions, ranging from strong
proponents of child empowerment, to advocates who are much more
reluctant to involve young children in shaping the outcome of a case

46. Id.
47. Id. (citing Harkins v. Driscoll, 334 A.2d 901, 903 (1973)).
48. Subsequent to the decision, a Connecticut appellate court echoed the Knock
court's view that "representing a minor child creates practical problems for an attorney
and that this important issue needs to be addressed." See Jaser v. Jaser, 655 A.2d 790,
794 n.4 (Conn. App. Ct. 1995) (citing Knock, 621 A.2d at 276). In some cases, parties
have complained that they have a right to know the purpose and scope of the child's
attorney's from the beginning of the attorney's entry into the case. See, e.g., Leary v.
Leary, 627 A.2d 30, 36 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993). In 1997, the Connecticut Supreme
Court squandered another opportunity to define the role of the child's representative in
divorce proceedings. See Schult v. Schult, 699 A.2d 134, 140 (Conn. 1997) (holding
that a child's attorney may advocate a different position than that recommended by the
guardian ad litem).
49. See PETERS, supra note 24, § 2-3 to 2-4, at 23-45 and accompanying text.
50. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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concerning their interests. 5 ' Despite these philosophical differences,
the Bar has reached a consensus on some of the most important
principles establishing the parameters of representing children.52 This
consensus creates a relatively uniform role for lawyers assigned to
represent children in virtually any type of legal proceeding. Indeed,
perhaps the first principle of the Bar is that, to the greatest extent
possible, lawyers should perform a uniform role when representing
children.
To achieve uniformity, the Bar adopted principles aimed at reducing
the exercise and range of discretion by lawyers when determining what
outcome to advocate in order to fulfill their responsibilities as a child's
lawyer. 3 The Bar employed three basic strategies to reduce lawyers'
discretion, two of which focus on the duties of lawyers when
representing children. The first strategy emphasizes that, whenever a
child client is old or mature enough to express a preference on the
outcome of the case, the child should control the choices of the lawyer
by being empowered to set the objectives of the litigation. 54 The
second strategy dictates that when lawyers are required to choose
which position to advocate on their client's behalf, lawyers may only
advocate for a particular result that clearly appears as the correct
result. 55 When more than one result could reasonably be reached,
lawyers are expected to present these multiple options to the court.56
In addition to these two strategies, a third strategy has gathered
momentum in the past two years. This strategy, which has been
5 1. See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, The Ethics of Empowerment: Rethinking the
Roles of Lawyers in Interviewing and Counseling the Child Client, 64 FORDHAM L. REV.
1655 (1996); Bruce C. Hafen & Jonathan 0. Hafen, Abandoning Children to their
Autonomy: The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 37 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 449 (1996).
5 2. See infra Part IV.
53. There is, of course, a wide degree of discretion that lawyers representing any
client, of whatever age, are always expected to exercise. It is not that kind of discretion
the Bar has sought to constrain, but rather the discretion that is unique to representing
children, particularly very young children.
54. See infra Part IV.A.
55. See infra Part IV.C. As used in this Article, the term "correct" means the result
that is most in accord with the child's rights as expressed in the substantive law
controlling the case.
56. Applying this consensus to Professors Bartholet and Howe in the hypothetical,
see supra, Preamble, the lawyer assigned to represent Lesley would be obliged to
conclude that more than one result reasonably could be reached and, therefore, the lawyer
would be expected to present multiple options to the court. Accordingly, Professors
Bartholet and Howe would both be expected to present all arguments in favor of
transracial adoptions along with all arguments against it. This situation would place the
judge in the best position to determine Lesley's best interests.
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employed only where the appointment of lawyers for children has not
yet become a well-established or routine practice, is to lessen the
appointment of lawyers for children. 7 Fearing more the random
power of lawyers for children to advocate for results the lawyers want
than that children might go unrepresented, this strategy rejects the
concept that lawyers for children are necessarily good, and requires
that the purpose for the use of a lawyer be clearly stated before a
lawyer is assigned to represent a child.
A. Mitigating the Discretionof the Child's Lawyer to Choose Which
Result to Seek
The first principle of this new consensus clearly asserts that, to the
greatest extent possible, legal representatives for children, regardless
of the child's age, should undertake a true lawyering role that is
distinct from either a specialized guardian-like role or a hybrid lawyerguardian role. 58 As the Fordham conferees stated:
The lawyer should assume the obligations of a lawyer, regardless
of how the lawyer's role is labeled, be it guardian ad litem,
attorney ad litem, law guardian or other. The lawyer should not
serve as the child's guardian ad litem or in another role insofar
as the role includes responsibilities inconsistent with those of a
lawyer for the child. 9
This principle is basic to developing a role for a child's courtappointed representative. It should also be regarded as directed both to
appointing authorities, such as courts and legislatures, and to the
practicing bar. Ultimately, however, its major impact will be on
lawyers assigned to represent children. This consensus is elegant and
clear: whenever possible, lawyers assigned to represent children
(regardless of the child's age) should serve as traditional lawyers.
This consensus arose out of deep skepticism toward allowing
lawyers to exercise independent judgment about what is best for their
clients.60 There are a number of reasons the Bar would choose to
57. See infra Part IV.B.
58. The Fordham Conference reached a consensus that lawyers should be appointed to
represent children in child protection, termination of parental rights, and foster care
proceedings, as well as cases involving delinquency, juvenile status offenses, and
mental health commitment. The attendees, however, did not agree whether lawyers for
children should be appointed routinely in adoption, custody and visitation and other
proceedings. Recommendations of the Conference On Ethical Issues in the Legal
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1301, 1320-23 (1996) [hereinafter
Conference Recommendations].
59. Id. at 1301.
60. In their recommendations, the Bar noted that, "[allthough other issues remain
unresolved, the profession has reached a consensus that lawyers for children currently

1998]

Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children

313

diminish the discretion exercised by representatives for children.
First, curtailing the lawyer's discretion to pursue the lawyer's desired
result, as opposed to the child's legal rights and preferences, reduces
the danger of interjecting the lawyer's personal opinions and values
into the proceedings. 6' Second, only by eliminating this discretion is it
possible to expect the same performance from all lawyers, regardless
of who happens to perform the role in any given case.62 Third,
limiting discretion will operate to restrict the lawyer's role to that
which lawyers are best trained to perform: trying to obtain an outcome
someone else has instructed them to reach rather than deciding which
outcome is best for the client. Finally, as will be demonstrated later in
this Article,63 mandating that attorneys act in accordance with the
statute's intentions ensures that the purpose of the substantive rules is
met.64
B. Avoiding the Danger of Children'sLawyers Unduly Influencing
the Outcome of a Case
Many issues concerning children's rights are rife with controversy
and disagreement. These disagreements often represent radically
different visions of what is best for children. For example, many
commentators believe that children's rights often are subjugated to the
rights of their parents and that, as a result, children are frequently
treated like property, rather than autonomous persons.65 Other
exercise too much discretion in making decisions on behalf of their clients including
'best interests' determinations." Id. at 1309.
6 1. The Bar noted that, "[r]eferences to the lawyer's own childhood, stereotypical
views of clients whose backgrounds differ from the lawyer's, and the lawyer's lay
understanding of child development and children's needs should be considered highly
suspect bases for decision-making on behalf of a client who lacks capacity." Id.
62. On this point, the Bar noted that decision-making on behalf of a child must be
made in a "contextual, self-aware, deliberate, and principled manner" and that the
process outlined in the recommendations is "intended to assist the child's lawyer in
identifying the legal interest or interests to be pursued." Id.
63. See infra Parts V.A, B.
64. For these and still other reasons, Jean Koh Peters has concluded:
It is ...necessary to abandon the guardian ad litem role for the following
reason: Lawyers playing the role of guardian ad litem often have felt
unconstrained by traditional lawyering duties. They have acted as witnesses,
they have abrogated duties of confidentiality, they have disregarded or
downplayed their client's desires, and they do not always include their client
in decision making in the representation.
Jean Koh Peters, The Roles and Content of the Best Interests in Client-Directed
Lawyering for Children in Child Protective Proceedings, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1505,
1523 (1996).
65. See, e.g., Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Out of the Children's Needs, Children's
Rights: The Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. PuB. L. 321, 325-27
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commentators protest compelling children in foster care to return to
their parents' custody even after they have formed psychological
bonds with their foster parents. 66 These debates form the foundation
(1994).
Parental rights are closely linked with an historic legacy of viewing the
child as the family patriarch's private property, which like other economic
rights, is secured from state expropriation, confiscation, or regulatory taking.
The parental rights of control and custody, constitutionalized ... in cases like
Meyer v. Nebraska [262 U.S. 390 (1923)], and Stanley v. Illinois [405 U.S.
645 (1972)], confer a strange liberty that consists in the right to control not
one's self or one's goods, but another human being ....
[T]he current discourse, in which children's mere "interests" are easily
overwhelmed by parents' powerful "rights," entails less obvious but equally
problematic choices about allocating power over children and about when
action or inaction constitutes state "intervention" or "oppression." Perhaps
children, as the least powerful members of both the family and the political
community, are also the least dangerous of rights-bearers and the most in need
of an affirmative rights rhetoric in order to be heard. By defining children's
rights as flowing from their needs, we can affirm rather than undermine an
ethic of care for others. By listening to children's voices and experiences as
evidence of their needs, and by trying to come to terms with the children's
reality, we can confront our own adult ambivalence and conflicts of interest
regarding children's rights.
Id.; see also Katherine Hunt Federle, Looking for Rights in all the Wrong Places:
Resolving Custody Disputes in Divorce Proceedings, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523, 155060 (1994) (commenting on children's powerlessness).
Tying rights to children's needs and incapacities, therefore, disadvantages and
disempowers children in the non-adjudicatory dispute resolution process.
Because an interest theory cannot accommodate children's powerlessness,
parents are free to treat their children as property and to use them as
bargaining chips with which they may obtain financial or emotional
concessions. . . . This property metaphor runs deep below our notions of
family integrity and autonomy and is reflected in the reluctance of many
mediators to interfere with parties' custody agreements, even when those
resolutions suggest that children's interests have been compromised. The
impoverishment of children's rights theories also explains why children have
no independent representation in the bargaining process; without a rights
theory that recognizes the value of claims made by children for themselves,
children will not gain the respect and power that comes with being a rights
holder.
Id. at 1562.
66. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD
(1973).
Whether any adult becomes the psychological parent of a child is based on
day-to-day interaction, companionship and shared experiences. The role can
be fulfilled either by a biological parent or by an adoptive parent or by any
other caring adult-but never by an absent, inactive adult, whatever his
biological or legal relationship to the child may be.
But once the prior tie has been broken, the foster or other temporary
placements can no longer be considered temporary. They may develop into or

1998]

Reconsidering the Need for Counsel for Children

315

of the law's development. Advocates who disagree with the current
law should be encouraged to express their views. But one thing ought
to be intolerable: children's lawyers should be prohibited from taking
the law into their own hands and choosing the particular results to
advocate for their clients based on the lawyer's own sense of what the
law should be.67
substantially begin to become psychological parent-child relationships,
which in accord with the continuity guideline deserve recognition as a
common-law adoption ....
Id. at 19, 39; see also George H. Russ, Through the Eyes of a Child. "Gregory K.": A
Child's Right to be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365 (1993) (providing a personal account by
the adoptive father of an eleven-year-old boy who petitioned a court in his own name to
terminate the rights of his biological parents and to allow adoption by his foster
parents).
When the psychological parent is someone other than the biological parent,
the devastating effects of removing the child from that parent are no less
tragic to the minor child. Yet, our courts and our social services systems
routinely and mechanically remove children from long-term placements with
persons they have come to believe and feel are their parents by considering
only blood ties to identify their "family" and thus return them to their
"rightful" parents. Children are literally "repossessed" by their biological
parents in the same manner as though they were property, capable of
ownership, without independent human rights of their own. It is time to
reevaluate the entire panoply of assumptions for dealing with our children and
develop a new "child-centered" perspective on parents' rights.
Id. at 388; see also Claudio DeBellis & Marta B. Soja, Note, Gregory K.: Child Standing
in Parental Termination Proceedings and the Implications of the Foster Parent-Foster
Child Relationship on the Best Interests Standard, 8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 501
(1993).
It is undisputed that extremely close emotional bonds may develop between a
foster parent and a foster child. These bonds usually form when a child has
lived with a foster family continuously over a period of time, and where
contact with the natural parents has been minimal or nonexistent. This
recognition is predicated upon the principle that "every child requires
continuity of care, an unbroken relationship with at least one adult who is and
wants to be directly responsible for his daily needs." Notwithstanding the
protection traditionally accorded to relationships between children and their
natural parents, bonds between foster children and foster parents merit
protection as well. Indeed, "rights which are normally secured over time by
biological or adoptive parents may be lost by their failure to provide
continuous care for the child and earned by those who do."
Id. at 528-29 (quoting JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD 40, 10 (1979)).
67. This danger lies, of course, in the hypothetical case, see supra, Preamble, in
which Professors Bartholet or Howe might have been selected to represent Lesley.
Professor Bartholet may well be right that Lesley's best interests would be served by
permitting the adoption. Unfortunately, Professor Howe might be right that Lesley's
interests would be disserved by such a result. But whomever is right, our legal system is
designed so that a judge will make that decision, not a randomly chosen member of the
bar. What is deemed an adequate system for representing children will remain elusive
until rules are developed ensuring that it will not make a difference whether, for example,

316

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

A recent public health issue illustrates the need to curtail the
lawyer's freedom to choose the best result for a young client. Lately,
observers have paid careful attention to the health problems associated
with second-hand smoking. In 1993, an American Bar Association
committee ("ABA committee") drafted a resolution supporting "the
enactment of state and federal legislation to protect children from the
health hazards of secondary smoke and to discourage children from
smoking." 68 One of the ABA committee's proposals sought to "make
parental smoking habits a factor to be considered in custody
determinations." 69 The ABA committee concluded that "[it is fully
justified for the state to interfere with the parental prerogatives of those
who elevate their own smoking needs above the obvious and
substantial health needs of their children."70 In addition, the ABA
committee recommended that states "mandate consideration of the
smoking habits of competing
potential adoptive families ... in making
'
decisions."'
placement
Although lawyers and committees act properly by promoting their
views, it should be unacceptable for an individual lawyer or
committee-member to represent a child in a custody or adoption case in
order to secure the child's rights in accordance with such views. Until
the legislature or case law 72 establishes second-hand smoking as a
factor for consideration in deciding custody or adoption cases, lawyers
for children should be barred from recommending a particular result on
a young child's behalf based on second-hand smoking factors. Any
recommendation by court-assigned counsel against adoption by a
smoking couple because the lawyer believes that the child's best
interests would be served by securing non-smoking adoptive parents
should similarly be impermissible. 73
Professor Bartholet or Professor Howe is appointed.
68. Comm. on the Rts. of Children, A.B.A. Sec. of Individual Rts. and
Responsibilities, Draft Resolution and Report, 1993 A.B.A. SEC. INDIVIDUAL RTS. AND
REsPONSIBILITIES 1.

69. Id. at 2.
70. Id. at 14.
71. Id. at 17-18.
The American Bar Association has not adopted these
recommendations.
72. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, No. 03A01-9603-CV-00078, 1996 WL 591181 (Tenn.
Ct. App. Oct. 11, 1996) (prohibiting father from smoking when in the presence of the
children to avoid endangering their health).
73. This is not to say it would be impermissible for lawyers to introduce the subject
to the judge so that the judge could take that factor into consideration. Thus, it would be
permissible for a lawyer for a six-month-old child to bring to the court's attention
scientific studies that demonstrate the harm and the risk of harm to children resulting
from parental smoking. The New York Times reported a study in 1997 by researchers at
the Department of Pediatrics, University of Wisconsin Medical School for example, that
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Some readers will agree it is difficult to justify this degree of
arbitrariness in the course of representing a young client, but will
consider it an exaggeration to suggest that such conduct by lawyers
constitutes taking the law into their own hands. These readers would
insist that the lawyer is simply one voice among many involved, and
that the final arbiter is, after all, the judge.
This objection is important and should be thoroughly examined.
For a number of reasons which are not obvious, the child's lawyer can
be a dispositive influence on the outcome in the vast majority of cases.
For one thing, judges are the final arbiter of only a fraction of
contested cases.74 The overwhelmingly probable method of
disposition of most custody disputes is a judicially ordered settlement.
Even when judges formerly approve settlements, they commonly have
little involvement in the process or outcome. In those cases that are
settled that include the services of a child's lawyer, the child's lawyer
often is a key player in shaping the outcome.7"
Even when judges do act as the final arbiter, judges freely admit to
listening very carefully to the child's representative, sometimes
confusing the representative's voice with the child's, and other times
regarding the voice as "neutral. 7 6 Experienced lawyers recognize as
"[alt least 6,200 children die each year in the United States because of their parents'
smoking, killed by such things as lung infections and burns." Parents Warned on
Smoking, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1997, at C2 (citing C. Andrew Aligne, MD & Jeffrey J.
Stoddard, MD, Tobacco and Children: An Economic Evaluation of the Medical Effects of
Parental Smoking, 1997 ARCHIVES OF PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 643, 651 tbl. 2).
There is a sharp distinction, however, between providing a judge with facts that might
be relevant to his determination of the case's outcome and advocating on behalf of the
child for a particular outcome based on those facts. The former acknowledges and retains
the judge as law enforcer, while the latter elevates the lawyer to the role of private
lawmaker.
74. See infra note 178, and accompanying text.
75. See Kim Landsman & Martha Minow, Lawyering for the Child: Principles of
Representation in Custody and Visitation Disputes Arising from Divorce, 87 YALE L.J.
1126, 1173 (1978).
The possibility of talking to all parties directly gives the child's attorney
unique advantages in obtaining information about the parents and the child,
since this information would rarely, if ever, be available to a parent's
attorney. As an investigator and as a representative of the person whose
interests are, by law, to prevail, the child's attorney is perceived by the
parents as a powerful, occasionally threatening, figure. Minimally, the
attorney is recognized as someone having leverage with the judge; some
parents and their lawyers attempted to cajole, lobby, or educate the child's
attorney as though arguing in court.
Id.
76. See, e.g., In re Ray A.M., 339 N.E.2d 135, 137 (N.Y. 1975) (stating, "[iut is
significant too that the Law Guardian for the child, a lawyer on the staff of the Legal Aid
Society, has submitted a useful and thoughtful brief and argument, urging that the Order
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"a practical reality in many cases," that "judges will simply defer to the
child's attorney's position." 77 This reality does not mean that the view
advocated by the child's lawyer always controls. 78 It does mean,
however, that the child's lawyer's view is quite important and that it
can be devastating to a party's hopes for success if the child's lawyer
proves to be a foe.
Allowing children's lawyers to make law as they see fit on a caseby-case basis sets into motion a version of private lawmaking by
randomly chosen lawyers. 79 Little is gained and much is lost when
of the Appellate Division be sustained. Since the child obviously cannot speak for
herself, this highly competent neutral submission is reassuring"); In re Adoption of
D.M.H., 682 A.2d 315, 322 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (stating "lilt is evident that the trial
court incorporated the child's advocate's opinion into its decision"), appeal denied, 690
A.2d 237 (Pa. 1997).
77. Ann M. Haralambie & Deborah L. Glaser, Practical and Theoretical Problems with
the AAML Standards for Representing "Impaired" Children, 13 J. AM. ACAD.
MATRIMONIAL LAW. 57, 92 (1995) (noting that it is a "dereliction of the judge's duties"
to simply defer to the child's advocate).
My own experiences have coincided with these practical realities as well. I have been
involved, on a regular basis, in cases where young children are represented by counsel
and the one constant that exists through those cases is the crucial need to win the child's
attorney to one's side in order to maximize the chances for success.
78. Reaction to this reality has been varied. As Landsman and Minow found,
[i]n practice, attorneys for the child perceived that they could wield a powerful
influence in court, but admitted that they did not control the custody
determination. The lawyers almost uniformly expressed the view that in cases
resulting in a contested hearing the judge relied heavily on their
investigations and recommendations. The extent of the judge's dependence on
them was a source of pride to some attorneys; others were annoyed and
troubled by the sense that some judges shifted the responsibility for the
ultimate decision to the child's lawyer.
Landsman & Minow, supra note 75, at 1184 (referencing a survey of several Connecticut
child custody attorneys).
79. Randomness in results generally is something to be avoided, not cultivated, in
any rational system of law. But this particular brand of randomness is the product of
lawyers' varying personal notions of right and wrong which are ultimately based on
their own values and prejudices. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF
CHILDREN: ADVOCACY, LAW REFORM, AND PUBLIC POLICY 50-51 (Robert H. Mnookin ed.
1985); Martha L. Minow, Interpreting Rights: An Essay for Robert Cover, 96 YALE L.J.
1860, 1889 (1987) (noting that "[t]he adult who offers the child's view, unmediated,
may advance an irrational or misguided position; the adult who supplies a preference
other than the child's has no obvious tether and lands in the thicket of general
uncertainty over what is good for the child"). Furthermore, this unfettered discretion is
generally not reviewable.
Returning once again to the hypothetical adoption case, laid out in the Preamble of
this Article, it is useful to observe that only those who prefer a particular outcome in the
adoption case are likely to care which lawyer is appointed to represent Lesley. In
contrast, those who do not prefer any particular outcome, but only want to ensure that
the judge is placed in the best position to decide the case in accordance with the law and
the child's best interests, will not prefer the appointment of one lawyer over the other.
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lawyers for children are allowed to become private lawmakers.
Among other implications, when lawyers become private lawmakers,
it becomes impossible to distinguish between well-intentioned changes
that advance the law and deliberate efforts to vitiate enlightened law.
Inevitably, these distinctions are futile because they are in the eye of
the beholder.
IV.

DIFFERENT METHODS FOR MITIGATING THE INFLUENCE OF
THE VIEWS OF A CHILD'S ATTORNEY

A.

Empowering Young Children

The Fordham consensus' preferred method of constraining a child's
lawyer's discretion generally requires that lawyers take their
instructions from their clients. According to the organized Bar, in
Nevertheless, even those preferring a particular outcome-that is, those who either
would or would not want the adoption to go forward-should recognize that their longterm interests would be ill-served by an attorney-assignment system in which the child's
lawyer is allowed to advocate for a particular preferred result. Under such a system, those
favoring the adoption would be unsatisfied if Howe were appointed and submitted a brief
in opposition to the adoption. Conversely, opponents of the adoption would regard
Bartholet's appointment as a similar misuse of the representation of children.
Those without an opinion on which lawyer should be appointed would likely expect
both lawyers to perform uniformly. Indeed, that is the precise reason they do not care.
In the long run, however, those who do care about the outcome should prefer that both
lawyers perform reasonably identically and not secretly prefer one to the other.
Statistically, their chances of securing the services of an attorney who wants the same
result as they do is only as high as the base rate in the population of the attorneys in the
assignment pool. In other words, their chances of benefiting from the assignment of a
particular person is directly a function of the extent to which their substantive
preferences are already embraced by other attorneys. But these advocates must come to
appreciate that when an attorney is appointed whom they would not prefer, that attorney
will be empowered to make choices antithetical to what the advocates really want.
Paradoxically, the only advocates who will benefit from this scheme are those advocates
who have already lost the substantive argument underlying the issues involved, or who
do not have realistic hopes of winning the argument. These advocates, in short, would
want an attorney-assignment mechanism that maximizes the chance to undermine laweven to subvert the substantive law-precisely because only by subversion can they
hope to achieve the results they covet. All others-those who have already won the
substantive debate, as well as those who have no interest in the first place in impacting
substantive law through the device of providing lawyers for children-should prefer the
establishment of rules and procedures to minimize the capacity of an attorney assigned
to represent a child to influence the outcome based on the values, preferences or beliefs
of the attorney.
Whatever else may be said on the subject of representing children, certainly all
advocates must agree that personality, opinion, values, mores, and biases should play as
limited a role as possible in carrying out the responsibilities of representing children in
legal proceedings. To be more precise, the objective must be to develop a system in
which such influences play a negligible role, like cases are decided alike, and the best
interests of children are served as often as achievable.

320

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

child protection proceedings, "[t]he lawyer for a child who is not
impaired (i.e., who has the capacity to direct the representation) must
allow the child to set the goals of the representation as would an adult
client."8 ° This is extraordinarily important because, aside from the
question of deciding which children have the "capacity to direct the
representation,"8' the organized Bar now insists that an unimpaired
child is the principal in charge of the litigation, and the lawyer is the
principal's agent. 2
The American Bar Association also endorses this view under its
recently adopted Standards of Practice for Lawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases ("ABA Standards").' These
ABA Standards apply in child protection proceedings, termination of
parental rights proceedings, and other custody disputes based on
allegations of abuse or neglect. 84 Whenever possible, the ABA
Standards insist that "the child's attorney must advocate the child's
articulated position."85 Like the Fordham consensus, the ABA
Standards prefer that lawyers regard their children clients as
sufficiently mature to set the case's objectives, and also recommend
that lawyers err on the side of overempowering their young clients.'
Under the ABA Standards, once the lawyer "ensure[s] that the
decision the child ultimately makes reflects his or her actual position,"
the lawyer has the duty to attempt to achieve the outcome the client
desires.87 In particular, the standards instruct that "[t]he child's
80. See Conference Recommendations, supra note 58, at 1301.
81. See text accompanying infra note 124 (describing ages eleven and under as the
mark of impairedness under the AAML Standards).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56 (endorsing the child's control in
setting the objectives of the litigation).
83. See Standards of Practice,supra note 9. The Standards were approved by the
Council of the Family Law Section in August, 1995. See Standards of Practice,supra
note 9, at 375.
84. See Standards of Practice, supra note 9, at 375 (stating that the standards are only
meant to apply when a lawyer is appointed for a child in any legal action based on (a) a
petition filed for protection of the child; (b) a request to a court to change legal custody,
visitation, or guardianship based upon allegations of abuse or neglect based on
sufficient cause; or (c) an action to terminate parental rights). The ABA Standards,
therefore, do not purport to include custody disputes arising from divorce proceedings.
85. Standards of Practice,supra note 9, cmt. A-I, at 376 (providing that "[t]o ensure
that the child's independent voice is heard, the child's attorney must advocate the child's
articulated position").
86. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
representatives to empower their child clients).
87. Standards of Practice,supra note 9, cmt. A-I, at 376 (providing that a "child's
attorney" owes the same duties of undivided loyalty, confidentiality, and competent
representation to the child as due an adult client).
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attorney should represent the child's expressed preferences and follow
the child's direction throughout the course of litigation. 88 This
position is in accord with many children's advocates' position on the
appropriate role of the child advocate. For example, Frank Cervone
and Linda Mauro recently wrote:
The ethic of self-determination remains the touchstone of most
forms of lawyer-client relationships; for lawyers, the client's
wishes govern virtually all choices and decisions, even that of the
lawyer's role. This principle was a fundamental tenet of the
Fordham Conference and is part of the proposed American Bar
Association's Standards of Practicefor Lawyers Who Represent
Children in Abuse and Neglect Cases ....
The virtue of such a precise and uniform standard of conduct lies in
its clarity. In every case, all lawyers must allow their client to set the
goals of the representation, provided that the client is "not impaired."
Pursuant to the ABA Standards, all unimpaired children are
empowered with the same fundamental rights as adults for the purpose
of being in charge of the attorney-client relationship.
It is important to underscore that this uniformity is achieved by
instructing lawyers to err on the side of empowering children. The
ABA Standards explicitly direct lawyers to advocate the position
articulated by the client "[iun all but the exceptional case, such as with a
preverbal child[.] '" The drafters of the ABA Standards do not assign
a minimum age for empowering children. To the contrary, the ABA
Standards
do not accept the idea that children of certain ages are
"impaired," "disabled," "incompetent," or lack capacity to
determine their position in litigation. Further, these Standards
reject the concept that any disability must be globally
determined. . . .Therefore, a child may be able to determine
some positions in the case but not others. Similarly, a child may
be able to direct the lawyer with respect to a particular issue at
one time but not at another. 9'

88. Id. Standard B-4, at 380. The Comment to Standard B-4 emphasizes the familiar
distinction ceding to lawyers the authority to make procedural decisions but preserving
to the client all substantive decisions. Thus, the Standards "do not require the lawyer to
consult with the child on [procedural] matters which would not require consultation with
an adult client." Id. at 381. But the standards stress that "the child is entitled to
determine the overall objectives to be pursued." Id.
89. Frank P. Cervone & Linda M. Mauro, Ethics, Cultures, and Professions in the
Representation of Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1975, 1985 (1996).
90. Standards of Practice,supra note 9, cmt. A-I, at 376.
91. Id. Cmt. B-3, at 379-80.
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Many children's advocates share this view. According to Jean Koh
Peters, for example, a child who can express opinions and be
"effectively counseled" must be empowered to control the lawyer's
advocacy:
The only time the child's lawyer may advocate for a position
other than that stated by the client, is after the lawyer, based
upon independent evidence arising outside of the representation,
has determined that the client's development or circumstances
preclude the client from either expressing a position or being
effectively counseled as to the viability of the position. Only
then may the lawyer seek appointment of a guardian or take
other protective action pursuant to Rule 1.14(b) or make
decisions on behalf of the client pursuant to EC 7.12.92
The ABA Standards do not envision that lawyers will automatically
yield to the child's initially articulated position. Instead, they expect
lawyers to advise the child on all of the available options and the
advantages and disadvantages of each option.93 Like the position of
many commentators, however, the standards also exhort lawyers to
avoid attempting to overly influence children in a particular direction
favored by the lawyer. 94 Professor Peters, for example, warns the
lawyer to control the temptation "to impose her own belief upon the
client." 95 In addition, she adds that although
[i]t may be easier . . . for a lawyer to seek to manipulate her
client into accepting the lawyer's position instead of disciplining
herself to advocate zealously for the client's position . . .
[b]ecause children are even more likely than adults to be cowed
by a lawyer's strong recommendation, the lawyer must
approach a child client's choice with particular restraint. 96
Martha Matthews issued a similar warning to lawyers representing
children when she stated, "[t]he child's lawyer has an ethical duty to
avoid using her superior skills and social position to silence the child's
voice, or coerce the child into passive compliance with the lawyer's
92. Peters, supra note 64, at 1565. Rule 1.14(b) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provides, "A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian or take other
protective action ... only when the lawyer reasonably believes that the client cannot
adequately act in the client's own interest." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.14 (1983). Ethical Consideration 7.12 states, "[i]f a client under disability has
no legal representative, his lawyer may be compelled in court proceedings to make
decisions on behalf of the client." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 712 (1980).
93. See Standards of Practice, supra note 9, cmt. B-4, at 380-81.
94. See id.
95. Peters, supra note 64, at 1521.
96. Id. (footnote omitted).
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views. ''

B. Curtailingthe Use of Lawyers for Children
In 1995, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers
("AAML") adopted standards for representing children in custody and
visitation proceedings.' Two years later, in 1997, a committee of the
American Bar Association's Family Law Section and the National
Council of Juvenile and Family Court Judges promulgated Principles
for Appointment of Representatives for Children in Custody and
Visitation Proceedings ("Principles"). 99 The AAML Standards and
these Principles" ° are remarkably in accord with one another. To a
somewhat lesser degree, these documents also echo the consensus
reached at the Fordham Conference.' 0 ' Like the Fordham consensus,
both documents, above all else, seek to create and implement
uniformity in the roles of all counsel for children."°2
Of the recent efforts to define the role of counsel for children, only
the AAML Standards and the Principles directly address the question
whether lawyers ought to be appointed for children in custody and
visitation proceedings. Both the AAML Standards and the Principles
were crafted from the view that the appointment of lawyers to
represent children is not invariably good. These documents take the
position that, at least in divorce and custody proceedings, appointment
of counsel should not be made unless a special reason exists. As the
Principles state,
[t]he failure to appoint a representative for a child . . . should

not be regarded as denying a child some kind of procedural or
substantive right. Instead, these Principles view the appointment
of a representative for a child as a tool that should be available
to courts-but not one that must be invariably used-to assist
courts to decide a contested case in accordance with the child's
best interests ....

103

97. Martha Matthews, Ten Thousand Tiny Clients: The Ethical Duty of
Representation in Children's Class-Action Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1458

(1996).
98. See AAML Standards, supra note 8.
99. These Principles have not yet been adopted by the American Bar Association.
See Principles, supra note 10.
100. The AAML Standards and Principles are collectively referred to as "documents."
101.
1281.

102.
103.

See Ethical Issues in the Legal Representation of Children, supra note 12, at

See supra notes 80-101; infra notes 103-149.
Principles, supra note 10, at 1-2.

324

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

While both the AAML Standards and the Principles focus heavily on
the issue of whether and when courts should appoint lawyers,'04 the
Fordham Conference focused exclusively on those areas of the law
that already require the presence of lawyers for children. The
Fordham conferees reached a consensus partly because they avoided
an extended discussion of whether and when lawyers ought to
represent children. For better or worse, case law and statutory law
already insist that children be represented in all child protection and
delinquency cases.' 0 5 By concentrating on the areas of law that
already require the appointment of lawyers for children, the Fordham
consensus developed parameters for what lawyers should do when
representing children in such cases. However, this consensus was
maintained only because the conference participants refused to answer
the question whether lawyers ought to represent children in situations
where neither case law nor statutes currently require representation." °
In contrast, the AAML Standards and the Principles focused on an
area of law where lawyers are not required by constitutional law,
common law, or statute to represent children.' °7 Despite the absence
of a mandate to use lawyers for children in custody and visitation
cases, courts' use of such lawyers in these proceedings has
proliferated.'0 Both the AAML Standards and the Principles conclude
that there is not an obvious need for lawyers to represent children in
custody and visitation cases and, therefore, there should be clearly
articulated reasons in each case before the appointment of a lawyer." 9
The Principles prohibit an appointment except when one of three
conditions exist: "[1] the failure to make ... an appointment would
impede the judge's capacity to decide the case properly,"' " 0 "[2] thel
failure to make ... an appointment would risk harm to the child,"' I
or "[3] the child's choice should become a more prominent part of the
104. See AAML Standards, supra note 8; Principles, supra note 10.
105. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 1 (1967); see supra note 24 and accompanying text.
106. See generally Conference Recommendations, supra note 58.
107. See, e.g., Elrod, supra note 7, at 56 (arguing in favor of mandatory
appointments, but recognizing the current lack of any requirement of counsel); David
Peterson, Judicial Discretion is Insufficient: Minors' Due Process Right to Participate
With Counsel When Divorce Custody Disputes Involve Allegations of Child Abuse, 25
GOLDEN GATE U.L.REV. 513, 527 (1995).
108. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
109. See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 1.1, at 1; Principles, supra note 10,
cmt. 1, at 3 (providing that although judges always retain discretion to appoint a
representative for a child, "these Principles contemplate that judges will exercise that
discretion sparingly").
110. Principles, supra note 10, Principle 2.A, at 3 (capitalization omitted).
111. Id. Principle 2.B, at 4 (capitalization omitted).
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case." " 2 Even when a court is authorized to appoint counsel for a
child, the Principles recommend that the court "consider appointing
persons who are not lawyers ...' I 3 whenever the tasks to be performed
advocacy." "

do not require legal
Somewhat less restrictive in its limitation on the circumstances in
which counsel may be appointed, the AAML Standards simply state
that the "[a]ppointment of counsel or guardians should be reserved for
those cases in which . . . the court finds after a hearing that

appointment is necessary in light of the particular circumstances of the
case.""' 4 Unlike the Principles, the AAML Standards spend more time
discussing the actions lawyers for children must undertake or may not
undertake once they are appointed." 5
In stark contrast with the Fordham consensus and the ABA
Standards, both the AAML Standards and the Principles reconceive the
purpose behind court-appointed representation of children. Under the
AAML Standards and the Principles, the type of representative to be
appointed and the representative's expected duties vary depending on
the purpose of the appointment. The Principles are more explicit in
this reconceptualization. The Principles regard the court-appointed
representative as "a tool that should be available to courts-but not one
that must be invariably used-to assist courts to decide a contested
case .... 116
Both the AAML Standards and the Principles require that a lawyer
representing an "unimpaired" child act as a traditional lawyer who
advocates the objectives the client desires."17 Drawing upon the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, the AAML Standards distinguish
between "unimpaired" and "impaired" clients. 18 When dealing with
unimpaired clients, a lawyer must allow the child to set the objectives
of the case, and attempt to secure the outcome desired by the client."'
112. Id. Principle 2.C, at 5 (capitalization omitted).
113. Id. Principle 6, at 7.
114. AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 1.1, at 1.
115. See id. Standards 2.6 through 2.13, at 2-4.
116. Principles, supra note 10, cmt. 1, at 2-3. The Principles make this point even
more clear in Principle 4: "The appointed representative for a child is accountable to the
judge for performance of the assigned functions." Id. at 6.
117. See Principles, supra note 10, cmt. to Principle 2.3, at 6 (noting that "[tlhese
Principles recognize that, pursuant to Rule 1.2(a) of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, lawyers for most clients are to abide by the client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation").
118. AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 2.1, at 2.
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1992). This rule
provides:
A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
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The AAML Standards set a higher threshold than both the Principles
and the ABA Standards for designating a child as "unimpaired." As
mentioned previously, the ABA Standards strongly prefer that lawyers
err on the side of overempowering their child clients rather than
advocate for the outcome preferred by the lawyer.120 The AAML, in
contrast, was reluctant to make it too easy or too common to obligate a
lawyer to represent a child in a contested custody or visitation
proceeding in order to secure the outcome preferred by the child.
Recognizing the significance of empowering children to set the
objectives for their lawyers, including the increased probability that
forceful advocates will secure the outcome desired by their children
clients,' 2 ' the AAML Standards utilize two devices for decreasing the
use of such advocates. First, the standards establish a presumption
that only children above a certain age are "unimpaired," thereby
liberating the lawyer in other circumstances from obligations to secure
the client's desired objectives. 122 Second, the Standards set a
relatively high age for presuming the child is "unimpaired."' 23 For
this purpose, the AAML Standards consider children ages twelve and
above presumptively unimpaired. 24 Like other recent efforts to define
the role of a child's lawyer, the AAML Standards permit lawyers to
treat children below the age of twelve as "unimpaired," and fail to
establish a minimum age limit for the purpose of determining
impairment.' 25 Nonetheless, the Fordham consensus and the ABA
Standards favor empowering children younger than age twelve. The
AAML, however, is unwilling to encourage this empowerment.
The symmetry of the AAML Standards and the Principles is
striking. Both contemplate and endorse the rule that lawyers for
unimpaired children must seek their clients' desired objectives.
Further, neither document requires the appointment of lawyers to
representation, subject to paragraphs (c), (d) and (e), and shall consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by
a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a
criminal case, the lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, after
consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, whether to waive jury
trial and whether the client will testify.
Id.
120. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
121. The norm of the legal profession is that lawyers are to "abide by a client's
decisions concerning the objectives of representation ....
".MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(a) (1992).
122, See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard and cmt. 2.2, at 17-23.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 19-21.
125. See id.
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represent unimpaired children, and both allow unimpaired children to
go unrepresented.' 26 Both the AAML Standards and the Principles
seek to constrain the capacity of the child's representative to do what
he or she thinks is best for the child by (1) requiring that courts give
specific instructions to the representative at the time of the assignment
and (2) clarifying the tasks and duties of representatives when their
client is not "unimpaired."' 127 Of all recent efforts, the Principles do
the most to reconceptualize the role of the court appointed
representative for the child. The Principles reconceive this
representative as the judge's aide, who performs a task needed by the
judge that, for whatever reason, the parties had not performed to the
judge's satisfaction."8
C. Representing Preverbaland Very Young Children
If adolescents represent the vast majority of children in child
protection proceedings or custody and visitation proceedings then the
information provided thus far by this Article would define the role of
counsel in the majority of cases. Alas, most of the children in these
proceedings are considerably younger.' 29 For this reason, much
remains to be discussed. In particular, it is essential to clarify what
lawyers should do on behalf of children who are too young or
126. See AAML Standards, supra note 8; Principles, supra note 10.
127 See Principles, supra note 10, cmt. 3, at 6 (noting that "[t]he wise course is to
articulate precisely at the outset of the appointment the reason the appointment is being
made and the duties the judge will expect the representative to perform").
128. See id. at 1.
129. This is a difficult proposition to prove. From the author's research, there
appears to be no national data on the age of children in child protective proceedings.
There is no question that many children in these proceedings are very young. The
difficult task is obtaining an accurate picture of the numbers.
To accomplish this, I contacted two court systems known to have complete computer
tracking capabilities and obtained figures showing the age of children at the time child
protective proceedings involving them were filed. In the first jurisdiction (Hamilton
County, Ohio), court officials reported that in 1994, 15.1% were less than one year old,
29.2% were less than three years old, 40.0% were less than five years old, 51.4% were
less than seven years old, and 65.1% were less than ten years old. See Letter from Lisa
H. Portune, Supervisor, Abuse, Neglect and Dependency Department of Court Services,
Juvenile Court, Hamilton County, Ohio 2 (Oct. 2, 1996) (on file with the author). In
1995, 14.3% were less than one year old, 27.5% were less than three years old, 41.3%
were less than five years old, 54.0% were less than seven years old, and 69.3% were less
than ten years old. See id. In the second jurisdiction (Vermont), court officials reported
that in fiscal year 1995-96, 50.1% were eight years old or younger. See Letter from Lee
Suskin, Court Administrator, Supreme Court of Vermont 2 (Jan. 22, 1997) (on file with
the author).
In Chicago, 36% of children in child protection cases are under two years old.
Interview with Patrick Murphy, Public Guardian of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois in
Chicago, IL (April 11, 1997).
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immature to instruct their lawyer to pursue a specific outcome.
Unquestionably, determining whether, and, if so, what to advocate on
a child's behalf, constitutes the most perplexing feature of representing
children who are too young to be empowered to direct their
representatives. Even the ABA Standards recognize that circumstances
will exist when children are too young to articulate a position or to be
empowered to instruct the lawyer to seek a specific outcome.1 30 The
organized Bar has spoken on the "whether" component, and authorizes
lawyers, at least in certain instances, to aggressively attempt to ensure
that a court reach a particular result.
1. Advocating the Child's Legal Interests
The "what" component of the representation is more complicated.
Although both the Fordham consensus position and the ABA
Standards continue to regard the lawyer for a preverbal child as the
child's "advocate," both sharply constrain the choices of advocacy
available to the child's representative. For very young and preverbal
children, the ABA Standards instruct the lawyer to advocate for a
result based on one of several factors. The lawyer is authorized to
advocate for the child's "legal interests,"' 3 1 which are "based on
objective criteria as set forth in the law that are related to the purposes
i 30. Though the ABA Standards charge the lawyer as the person to determine whether
the client should be regarded as being "under a disability," they are completely silent on
advising lawyers how to distinguish between children who are under a disability and
those who are not. See Standards of Practice, supra note 9, Standard B-3, at 379.
Many cannot help but regard the ABA Standards as extreme. For example, even when a
lawyer regards a client as being under a disability, the ABA Standards prefer that the
expressed wishes of the client bind the choice of the attorney. See id. Standard B-4, at
380. The Standards even prefer lawyers of children too young to express a preference to
"make a good faith effort to determine the child's wishes and advocate accordingly." Id.
Standard B-4(l), at 381. They then take this notion still further. Even when children are
too young to be empowered to set the objectives of the case, the ABA Standards make
clear that the child's preferences must control on such matters as whether the child wants
the lawyer to take a position or remain silent with respect to any or all particular issues.
See id. Standard B-4(2) cmt., at 381. When the child has a view on this, "[tlhe position
taken by the lawyer should not contradict or undermine other issues about which the
child has expressed a preference." Id. Similarly, whether or not the child testifies or
gives any evidence is for the child to decide, not the attorney. See id. Standard D-6, at
390.
The organized Bar recognizes that,
the lawyer's responsibilities with respect to the child whom he represents will
vary depending on whether the child has capacity to direct the representation.
If the child is preverbal or otherwise cannot direct the representation, the
lawyer must decide what position or range of positions to present to the court
on the child's behalf.
Green & Dohrn, supra note 13, at 1295.
131. See Standards of Practice, supra note 9, Standard B-5 cmt., at 383-84.
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of the proceedings."' 132 The Fordham conferees use the identical
concept and require lawyers to "narrow the area of inquiry by
determining the legal interests of the child."' 133 More particularly, in
child protection cases, the ABA instructs lawyers to follow the
objective criteria established by law that define the child's legal
interests. These criteria should "address [1] the child's specific needs
and preferences, [2] the goal of expeditious resolution of the case so
the child can remain or return home or be placed in a safe, nurturing,
and permanent environment, and [3] the use of the least restrictive or
detrimental alternatives available."' 34
2. Proposing Multiple Options or Not Advocating Any Result
It is not sufficient merely to identify the client's legal interest.
Before advocating for an outcome, it is also necessary that the lawyer
first conclude that there is only one clearly correct result to achieve.
Specifically, the organized Bar expects lawyers to identify the
"definitively preferable option" for their child clients. 35 To minimize
the danger of disparate advocacy stemming largely from the assigned
attorney's values, 136 the Fordham consensus position requires that
lawyers first be certain that the position they want to advocate is
definitively preferred. At the same time, however, the Bar recognizes
that, in many cases, "the lawyer may be left with more than one
option." 137 In the many situations when a lawyer is not certain, the
Fordham consensus directs that "[tihe lawyer then should ensure that
evidence is presented on the remaining options to the court, and in
opposition to all options that were actually available[,] but that have
been eliminated from the child's legal interest ....
132. Id. Standard B-5, at 383.
133. Green & Dohrn, supra note 13, at 1310. A "legal interest" is defined as "any
interest that the legal proceeding has authority to address." Id.
134. Id.
135. Conference Recommendations, supra note 58, at 1311.
136. As Robert Mnookin warns, when lawyers are liberated in this way there can be
no "assurance that the advocate is responsive to the children's interests, and is not
simply pressing for the advocate's own vision of those interests, unconstrained by
clients .... " MNOOKIN, supra note 79, at 43. See also David L. Chambers & Michael S.
Wald, Smith v. Offer, in MNOOKIN, supra note 79, at 69 (discussing litigation in which
"a number of lawyers who appeared in [a case] each claiming to speak for the interests of
the children ... were pitted against each other").
137. Robert Schwartz, Group Leader, Report of the Working Group on Determining
Best Interests of the Child, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1347, 1350 (1996) [hereinafter
Working Group] (stating that even after a methodical winnowing of the child's legal
options, the lawyer may not be able to determine one single option to be the best).
138. Conference Recommendations, supra note 58, at 1311.
At the end of this sifting, spiral-like search for best interest, the lawyer may
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The AAML Standards attempt to avoid disparity of lawyer advocacy
by prohibiting lawyers from advocating any result when the client is
too young to set the objectives of the case. Of all the guidelines
recently promulgated, the AAML is the most restrictive regarding what
lawyers may do for children who are too young to set the case
objectives. While the Fordham consensus, the ABA Standards, and
the Principles all allow lawyers in limited circumstances to advocate
for a particular result, even when representing a child too young to set
the objectives for the case, the AAML flatly prohibits the lawyer from
advocating any outcome in such circumstances.' 39 This restriction is
so broad that it prohibits all representatives of children-whether they
are called lawyers, law guardians or guardians ad litem-from making
any recommendation about the outcome or from advocating any
particular result to the court.' 4°
The AAML Standards prohibit attorneys for impaired clients from
advocating an outcome even when the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct ("Professional Rules") permit a lawyer to recommend a
particular result. 41 The AAML understood it was limiting the
lawyer's role to a greater degree than current law and rules require.
The AAML Standards do not run afoul of the Professional Rules
because the Professional Rules permit, but do not require, attorneys
representing impaired clients acting as de facto guardians to
recommend an outcome in the case. 42 The AAML concluded that
be left with more than one option. The Working Group felt that it would be
ultra vires for the lawyer to choose one of those legitimate options to present
to the decision maker. Indeed, in order for this process itself to be legitimate,
the lawyer should not become the decision maker, but must recognize that for
the impaired client, presenting more than one option to the decision maker
offers an ethically permissible result. The lawyer should also explain why she
excluded other apparent options, and advocate against those options.
Working Group, supra note 137, at 1350.
139. See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 2.7, at 3.
140. Id. Standard 2.7 prohibits a lawyer from advocating a position with regard to
the outcome of the proceeding when representing a client who is unable to set the goals
of the representation. See id. Similarly, Standard 3.2 prohibits a guardian ad litem from
recommending a particular result. See id. Standard 3.2, at 4.
141. See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 2.7, at 27; infra note 142.
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.14 cmt., at 45 (1983). Rule
1.14 directs:
(a) When a client's ability to make adequately considered decisions in
connection with the representation is impaired, whether because of minority,
mental disability or for some other reason, the lawyer shall, as far as
reasonably possible, maintain a normal client-lawyer relationship with the
client.
(b) A lawyer may seek the appointment of a guardian to take other protective
action with respect to a client, only when the lawyer reasonably believes that
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representatives for young children should attempt to ensure that the
adversary process results in the "correct" outcome by ascertaining all
relevant facts and placing them before the judge, thereby enabling the
judge to decide the case based on the child's best interests.'43 For this
reason, the. AAML Standards instruct lawyers to "refuse to adopt any
particular posture in the case and limit all activities to investigation,
presentation, and examination of evidence material
to the proceeding,
' 44
client."'
the
of
wishes
expressed
the
including
Because the AAML Standards flatly prohibit advocacy in the
representation of impaired children while the organized Bar permits
such advocacy,' 45 one might imagine that these rules contain
significant discrepancies. Certainly, when the rules result in a lawyer
advocating a particular outcome in one case and not doing so in
another, the rules could not be more disparate. Two aspects of this
difference, however, require further elaboration. First, it will greatly
matter how often lawyers conclude that a particular outcome is
the client cannot adequately act in the client's own interest.
Id.
Instructively, nowhere do the Professional Rules demand that a lawyer, or a guardian
for that matter, advocate an outcome on behalf of "impaired" clients. The Commentary
to Rule 1.14 states only that: "If the person has no guardian or legal representative, the
lawyer often must act as de facto guardian. Even if the person does have a legal
representative, the lawyer should as far as possible accord the represented person the
status of client, particularly in maintaining communication." Id. Rule 1.14 cmt., at 45.
143. See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standards 2.11 - 2.13, Standards 3.6 - 3.8, at
31-36, 42-44. The AAML concluded that cases are most likely to be decided on the basis
of what is best for children when lawyers representing impaired children "inquire
thoroughly into all circumstances that a careful and competent person in the [child'sl
position should consider in determining the [child's] interests with respect to the
proceeding." See id. at 22 n.20 (quoting Institute for Judicial Administration/American
Bar Association's Juvenile Justice Standards-Standards Relating to Counsel for Private
Parties, Standard 3.1(b) and cmt. (1982)).
144. Id. Standard 3.1(b) cmt. A possible criticism of the neutral lawyer role which
uncovers evidence the lawyer reasonably believes a careful judge would want to know is
that there really is no such thing as neutrality. Therefore, since neutrality is not really
possible, somehow it is believed that partisanship should be encouraged.
It is interesting to observe, by contrast, how the public ultimately regards the judge.
The judge's formal role is to do what is legally possible to advance the child's interests.
In one sense, the judge is to act as the child's representative. However, the public is
often wary of judicial power when judges decide the fate of people before them under the
fiction that they are acting as a faithful representative, charged to protect the person's
well-being. Rather, the public is much more comfortable regarding the, judge quite
differently, provided the conceptual underpinnings are fully satisfactory. The public
comfortably regards the judge as a neutral factfinder. If one reconceives the function of a
very young child's lawyer from being an advocate for the child to creating a fair record
for the judge, it is unclear why there should be such cynicism about deeming the lawyer
neutral.
145. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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"definitively preferable."' 4 6 This conclusion is a precondition to
advocating for only one outcome. If it turns out there is a very small
universe of cases with "definitively preferable" outcomes, then the
practice of advocating for particular results will rarely occur. The less
such cases occur, the smaller the differences between the organized
Bar and the AAML become.
Moreover, if this "definitively preferable" outcome category
constitutes only a narrow class of cases, then the worst dangers of
randomly selected lawyer advocacy will have been eliminated.
Because it can safely be assumed that virtually all lawyers assigned to
represent children in this narrow class of cases will reach the same
conclusion about the correct outcome, the threat of arbitrariness is
reduced. Indeed, the core meaning of a "definitively preferable"
outcome must be that all rational observers would agree with the
outcome. In this sense, the best test the lawyer should use when
determining whether or not a particular outcome is "definitively
preferable," is not whether the lawyer strongly believes that the
outcome is correct, but whether the lawyer could conceive of another
lawyer disagreeing with the outcome. If lawyers use the "Is-itconceivable-that-another-lawyer-could-disagree-with-me?" standard,
then the danger of arbitrary behavior is reduced to almost nothing.
Because every lawyer would pursue the same result if given the
opportunity, the significance of which lawyer is assigned completely
diminishes.
Yet another viewpoint suggests that there is little danger of random
advocacy affecting a case's outcome. In the narrow band of cases
with "definitively preferable" outcomes, the likelihood that the judge
will decide the case "correctly" similarly increases despite the advocacy
by the child's lawyer. Even for policy makers and children's
advocates who do not have the highest regard for judges in custody
and divorce proceedings, it is difficult to imagine that these judges
would be unable or unlikely to decide a class of "definitively
preferable" outcome cases correctly. For these reasons, there may be
little to fear from lawyers for children advocating for a particular result
that is not based on the outcome desired by the child, provided lawyers
really limit the occasions on which they choose to advocate for such a
result to those few cases in which the outcome is definitively
preferable.
Whether and to what extent the views of the organized Bar clash
with the views of the AAML in the real world will thus depend on the
146.

See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
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frequency that lawyers deem an outcome as "definitively preferable."
In all other respects, however, the two policies achieve a useful
symmetry. In practice, the AAML's solution of prohibiting advocacy
of any kind 4 7 amounts precisely to the same course of action as when
lawyers present all options. Indeed, the AAML's meaning of nonadvocacy derives from an unarticulated reconceptualization of courtappointed counsel, which the Principles expressly articulate."
In the final analysis, the extent of agreement between the AAML
Standards and the other proposals remains unclear because such a
comparison depends on how lawyers actually behave. Under all of the
proposals, including the AAML's proposal, lawyers continue to
possess a wide degree of discretion concerning client
empowerment. 49 In addition, when lawyers treat their clients as
unable to set the case's objectives (for whatever reason), a lawyer's
determination that there is only one definitively preferred outcomewhich thereby allows the lawyer to be a forceful advocate for that
result-is practically unreviewable.
Conversely, lawyers remain free to conclude that no one particular
result is "definitively preferable." Thus, lawyers unavoidably continue
to have a substantial degree of discretion. They remain free to decide
not only whether their clients should be empowered, but also whether
they should provide the court with one option or a range of different
options. Because each of the discussed proposals prohibit a lawyer
from advocating for particular results which are not conclusively
correct, a greater symmetry among the proposals will occur if lawyers
rarely conclude that only one result is clearly best.
V. RECONSIDERING WHEN CHILDREN SHOULD BE REPRESENTED
To summarize the previous section, a unifying purpose forms the
core of the organized Bar's consensus: increasing the probability that
different lawyers will seek like results in like cases. Achievement of
this purpose can occur by allocating decision-making authority to the
client whenever possible, binding the lawyer to seek the result desired
by the client. When lawyers cannot be bound to advocate the
preference of their clients, they may advocate for a particular result
only when that result is definitively preferred. 5 ° Moreover, this
147. See supra text accompanying note 139.
148. See supra note 116 and accompanying text (describing the court appointed
representative as ideally a "tool" to help in deciding the case which need not always be
used).
149. See supra Part IV.A.
150. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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"preference" should be based not on what the lawyer wants or would
want, but on the law's definition of the child's legal rights.' Finally,
when no one result appears clearly "correct," lawyers should present
options to the court without advocating for a particular
multiple
152
result.
This is an important statement by the Bar and courts are advised to
pay it careful attention. It may become increasingly difficult to
determine when a lawyer for a child is aggressively advocating a
particular outcome because the client wants the outcome or because the
lawyer independently thinks the outcome is best. Effective children's
advocates will recognize that the force of their advocacy diminishes
once the judge comprehends that the lawyer's advocacy is merely the
product of the client's wishes without the lawyer's endorsement. For
this reason, the most effective lawyers for children will deliberately
blur their advocacy to prevent judges from detecting the lawyer's
actual basis for arguing for a particular outcome.
Decision-makers responsible for allowing representation for
children should now rethink what they have wrought. As lawyers
increasingly look to their young clients for what outcome to seek,
courts and legislatures should re-evaluate the wisdom of providing
children with lawyers in the first place. In child protection and
custody and visitation proceedings, for example, it is unclear whether
judges or legislators would want a child's preference in the outcome to
become more influential merely because the child is provided with
legal representation. This is unclear because courts and legislatures
consistently refuse providing children with rights to obtain the
outcome they desire. Indeed, in certain areas of the law, such as child
protection cases, the child's preferences may be literally irrelevant to
the decision-maker. 53 In other areas, such as custody or visitation
cases, the child's preferences are supposed to be little more than one
factor a court should consider when deciding the case."
One might anticipate that legislatures and courts prefer a better
symmetry between children's substantive rights and their procedural
rights. Outside the right to counsel area, courts routinely reject
children's claims of entitlement to particular procedural rights when
granting such rights would be inconsistent with substantive rights. A
151. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
152. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
153. For a more detailed discussion of this proposition, see Martin Guggenheim, A
Paradigmfor Determining the Role of Counselfor Children, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1399,
1428-30 (1996).
154. See infra note 179 and accompanying text.
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1995 Illinois appellate case illustrates this point. In In re Marriage of
Thompson, 55 a fifteen-year-old child petitioned the court for a change
of custody after the court awarded custody to one parent. The trial
court denied the child standing to petition to modify court orders."
The appellate court affirmed, rejecting the child's claims that he had
standing under the relevant state statute and that the failure to accord
him standing violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal
protection of the laws.'
The Thompson court interpreted the statute as precluding children
from petitioning for reconsideration or modification of judgments."
Although the child wished to live with nonparents who obtained
custody of the child following his mother's death, the court reasoned
that,
there is no discernible legitimate benefit from granting a minor
standing to bring a petition on behalf of nonparental parties. If
the nonparents wish to obtain custody of the child and believe
that they can show that the child is not in the physical custody
of a parent, they may file a section 601(b)(2) petition
themselves. If the nonparents do not desire custody, it would be
untenable to allow the minor to bring an action to force the
court (and the59 natural parent) to give the nonparents what they
do not want.'
According to the court, children have neither the substantive right to
live without adults, nor the substantive right to pick which adults rear
them. 60 A child's substantive right in this context can best be
described as simply the right to be ordered by a court to reside with
someone chosen by the court. The court concluded that because the
law allows persons who might conceivably be granted custody to
petition the court for custody, a child is deprived of nothing when
denied the independent power to petition the court.' 6' The court
further rejected as "meritless" the claim that the decision denies the
child the constitutional right to be heard. 62 Though this ruling may
155. 651 N.E.2d 222 (I11.App. 2d Dist. 1995).
156. See id. at 223-24.
157. See id. at 226. The statute to which the court referred is the Illinois Marriage
Act which states, "a child custody proceeding is commenced in the court ... by a person
other than the parent, by filing a petition for custody of the child in the county in which
he is permanently a resident or found, but only if he is not in the physical custody of one
of his parents[.]" 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/601(b) (West 1992) (amended 1993).
158. See In re Marriage of Thompson, 651 N.E.2d at 225.
159. See id. at 226.
160. See id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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appear harsh or crude, the court reached the correct conclusion. As
the court stated:
Petitioner claims that he has been deprived of his due process
right to be heard on his petition for a change of custody. He
maintains-or assumes-that the right of a minor to pursue an
action for a change of custody is akin to one of several
constitutional rights (such as counsel in criminal cases or
abortion rights) that unemancipated minors share with adults.
However, a minor child has no due process liberty interest in
of relatives against the
remaining in the physical possession
63
wishes of the natural parent.
In addition to due process, the child asserted that "denying him
standing to bring his petition creates an impermissible classification
that denies him his fundamental right to counsel."'" In rejecting this
claim, the court correctly reasoned that,
[pletitioner begs the question: he has no right to counsel in
bringing his action if he has no right to bring the action in the
first place. That a minor is entitled to counsel when the State
seeks to deprive him of his liberty in no way demonstrates that
he is constitutionally entitled
65 to bring a civil action to determine
his own legal guardians.
As demonstrated by the reasoning employed in Thompson, an
important relationship exists between substance and procedure. One
ought not succeed in claiming a violation of the procedural right to
counsel (something which some courts are loath to deny) without first
demonstrating the violation of a substantive right in the absence of this
procedural protection. Not all procedural rights advance a child's
substantive rights or are necessary to ensure the respecting of a child's
substantive rights. The child's claim in Thompson, though
superficially appealing, is a splendid example of question-begging.
So, too, are the many calls for counsel for children without or before a
discussion of the other related rights children enjoy."
163. Id. at 226.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See McDowell v. McDowell, 868 P.2d 1250 (Mont. 1994). In McDowell, the
Montana Supreme Court held that counsel for children is required only "when the child
needs an advocate to represent his position as to the issues in dispute or to insure the
development of an adequately complete record concerning the best interests of the
child." Id. at 1255 (quoting In the Matter of Inquiry into J.J.S., Youth in Need of Care,
577 P.2d 378, 381 (Mont. 1978)). The McDowell court overruled a 1977 case, see In re
Gullette, 566 P.2d 396 (Mont. 1977), which had held that when custody is in "serious
dispute," a trial court must appoint independent counsel for the child or state why such
appointment is unnecessary. See McDowell, 868 P.2d at 1255. Because issues were
carefully considered and a complete record was developed concerning the children's best
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Courts and legislatures must take responsibility for the odd
development of the law in this field. By affording lawyers for children
before carefully examining the lawyers' duties, courts and legislatures
created a vacuum which the organized Bar has finally attempted to fill
by defining the role of counsel. The organized Bar has rejected the
practice of many courts that depend on lawyers for children to
recommend a particular result even when the client is too young to
express a preference. The Bar has concluded that, in a choice between
empowering lawyers and empowering clients, it will empower clients,
even when they are very young.167
Courts and legislatures are now left with several choices. First,
they can leave the state of the law as it is, knowing that lawyers
increasingly will advocate the outcomes preferred by their clients.
Second, through judicial opinions and statutes, they can redefine the
role of counsel for children in ways that disagree with the Fordham
consensus, for example, by removing altogether the lawyer's capacity
to advocate any outcome for the child. 68 Finally, courts and
interests, it was not error to have refused a request to appoint counsel. See id. at 1254.
167. See supra Part IV.
168. This invitation for legislatures to define the duties of court-appointed
representatives for children admittedly may lead to results which I personally disfavor.
California's recent efforts to define legislatively the duties of counsel for children in
child protection proceedings represent a perfect example. In 1996, the California
legislature amended its statute authorizing the appointment of counsel for children to
provide explicit guidelines for counsel's actions. The statute now contains a mandate
that "[a] primary responsibility of any counsel appointed to represent a minor pursuant
to this section shall be to advocate for the protection, safety, and physical and
emotional well-being of the minor." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(c) (West Supp.
1997). In addition, the statute now states:
In any case in which the minor is four years of age or older, counsel shall
interview the minor to determine the minor's wishes and to assess the minor's
well-being, and shall advise the court of the minor's wishes. Counsel for the
minor shall not advocate for the return of the minor if to the best of his or her
knowledge, that return conflicts with the protection and safety of the minor.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1997) (amended provision in italics).
The California legislature does not appear to want a child in child protection
proceedings to have "counsel." It actually wants a second prosecutor assigned to the
case who will veto any proposal to return a child to his or her family unless this second
prosecutor is confident such return will not endanger the child. Such a scheme is plainly
within the legislature's power to create. Unfortunately, the legislature chose to continue
calling this person the child's counsel.
The question that remains is which set of rules prevail when a lawyer is appointed as
counsel for an unimpaired minor? Rule 1.2 of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT unambiguously demands that the lawyer allow the client to set the objectives
of the representation and instruct the lawyer on what outcome to seek. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2 (1983). Another set of rules, section 317(e) of the
CALIFORNIA WELFARE AND INSTITUTIONS CODE, forbids counsel from advocating a result
that, in the lawyer's best judgment, conflicts with the client's protection and safety.
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legislatures can eliminate the use of lawyers for children in a variety of
proceedings in which the appointment of lawyers occurs only because
of case law or statute. But if they do nothing, we can expect lawyers
representing children to act in conformity with the consensus the Bar
has achieved.
A.

What Can Now Be Expectedfrom a Lawyer Representing an
Average Ten-Year- Old in a Contested Custody Case
Because disagreement no longer exists about the role of counsel
representing unimpaired children, forceful advocacy for these
children's desires can be expected, whether or not a court or legislature
would want such advocacy.1 69 Moreover, the Bar's consensus
entrusts the lawyer to determine the client's capacity to establish the
case's objectives. In the words of the AAML:
Under both the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model
Rule 1.14) and the Code of Professional Responsibility (Ethical
Consideration 7-12), attorneys are obliged to make the
case-by-case determination regarding a client's capacity to set
the goals of the representation. This is an impossible task for
judges to perform since it requires spending many hours with a
client. Moreover, counsel's determination is not properly
subject to review by a court because any judicial inquiry would
necessarily intrude into the confidential communication between
counsel and the client. 70
Of the guidelines discussed in this Article, only the AAML
Standards attempt to use an objective chronological criterion to
distinguish among children: children aged 12 or older are presumed to
be capable of directing the lawyer's actions. 7 ' Even the AAML
Standards, however, permit treating children under twelve as
impaired, and children older than twelve as unimpaired. The other
standards 172
make it clear that no age is too young for empowering verbal
children.

See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 317(e) (West Supp. 1997). Whatever the answer to this
puzzle, the law is better served when the legislature recognizes a duty to define the role
of a child's representative, even if I disagree with what the legislatures ultimately decide.
169. See generally Federle, supra note 51 (discussing various techniques for
becoming an effective advocate).
170. AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 2.2(c) cmt., at 22-23. This statement
is in accord with all of the recent proposals. See Principles, supra note 10, Principle
2.2(1), at 32; Standardsof Practice,supra note 9, Standard B-3, at 379-80.
171. See Part V.
172. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
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The AAML Standards also more explicitly than the other model
proposals describe what lawyers should consider when determining a
client's impairment. They instruct lawyers to "focus on the process by
which a client reaches a position, not on the position itself.' 73 In
particular, these standards direct lawyers to "evaluate the child's ability
to engage in a coherent conversation and to comprehend the nature of
the proceedings."' 74 At least for children aged twelve and older, the
lawyer must treat a client as unimpaired as long as he or she,
is able (a) to understand the nature and circumstances of the
case, (b) to appreciate the consequences of each alternative
course of action, (c) to engage in a coherent conversation with
the lawyer about the merits of the litigation, and (d) to express a
preference that similarly situated persons might choose or that is
derived from rational or logical reasoning .... 175
The Principles, by contrast, are silent as to how lawyers should
determine whether their client is unimpaired. 76
In light of the strong consensus toward client empowerment, courts
and legislators now must face the real challenge of reconsidering the
wisdom of appointing counsel for children in the first place. A
hypothetical case will serve to illustrate this point. In this case,
divorcing parents are contesting the custody of their eleven-year-old
son, Robert. The mother has served as the primary caregiver,- having
put aside her career as a teacher. She spent more time raising Robert
than the father, and assumed the role of disciplinarian. She insisted
that Robert adhere to a strict study schedule, and always imposed a
shorter curfew on Robert than the parents of Robert's friends. The
mother, however, occasionally uses marijuana. The father is a
recently retired professional athlete. Unlike the mother, the father does
not believe in being a strict disciplinarian. Since his parents'
separation last year, Robert lives primarily with his mother, while only
living with his father for about two months each year.
Robert tells his court-assigned lawyer that he wants to live with his
father. When asked for more information by his lawyer, Robert
explains that he prefers living with his father because he can stay up
later each night, have a later curfew, and does not have to do his
homework for as long as he does when living with his mother.
173. AAML Standards, supra note 8, Standard 2.2(b) cmt., at 21.
174. Id. at 21-22.
175. Id. at 22 (footnote omitted).
176. The only direction the Principles provide is that "lawyers will continue to make
the determination whether their client is empowered to set the objectives of the case or
not." Principles, supra note 10, Principle 7 cmt., at 8.
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In accordance with the organized Bar's consensus of her role, the
attorney concludes that her proper role is to advocate Robert's
position.'77 Accordingly, the lawyer chooses to litigate the case
vigorously with the goal of securing a final order that places Robert
with his father. This advocacy increases the probability that the
outcome of the case is in accordance with what Robert wants, which is
to live with his father.
This result is more likely for two reasons. First, the lawyer's
advocacy for the father's custody may succeed in pretrial conferences
with other counsel, the court, or both. Consequently, the powerful
influence of the child's lawyer may induce settlement and give custody
to the father.'78 Second, should no agreement be reached, the lawyer
will proceed to investigate the case, hoping to uncover facts to
introduce at trial supporting Robert's position. (In the process of
investigating the lawyer will not seek to uncover negative facts about
the father or favorable facts about the mother, except to avoid being
surprised at trial.) The lawyer also retains an expert who will be used
at trial to support the awarding of custody to the father and to
demonstrate why the mother would be an inferior custodian. Although
the case is closely contested, the lawyer's skill at amassing facts,
tenacity in cross-examining adverse witnesses, and eloquence in
summation contribute substantially to the court's final order awarding
custody to the father.
In this hypothetical, it might be said that the court's appointment of
a lawyer for Robert increased the danger of thwarting the substantive
law of the jurisdiction by giving Robert's preference more weight than
his best interests. In every sense, the lawyer's skilled advocacy
remained consistent with the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and
the highest standards of the legal profession. In the process, however,
frustration of the law may result because the child's views are only
supposed to serve as one factor (frequently a minor one) that the judge
177. See Conference Recommendations, supra note 58, at 1312-13. See also MODEL
Even under the AAML Standards,
Robert's lawyer could easily consider Robert to have sufficient capacity to set
objectives once he demonstrated an understanding of the choices raised by his case and
advanced coherent reasons for his preference. See AAML Standards, supra note 8, Rule
2.4, at 2 (stating that "[u]nimpaired clients, regardless of age, have the right to set the
goals of representation").
178. Many commentators have observed that most matrimonial cases are resolved
without an actual trial through negotiation and settlement; moreover, settlements are
accomplished because the parties assess the various risks and probabilities of prevailing
at trial, taking into account the prevailing substantive law. See, e.g., Robert H.
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.2(a) (1983).
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79
takes into account in deciding the case. 1

179. See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-106 (1996). This provision states that
courts must consider the reasonable preferences of children ages twelve and older and
must "listen" to any preferences expressed by younger children, thus giving greater
weight to the preferences of older children.
Currently, no jurisdiction mandates that the child's preference be dispositive. Rather,
at most, the child's preference is to be considered as one factor among many in
determining the outcome. See Calhoun v. Calhoun, 179 So. 2d 737, 740 (Ala. 1965)
(giving weight to child's age and preference among other factors in child custody
proceeding); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c) (Michie 1996) (allowing for consideration of
child's preference if of sufficient age and capacity); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(A)
(West Supp. 1997) (providing that court should consider all relevant factors in custody
determinations including the child's wishes); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-124 (West
1997) (directing the court to consider child's wishes in custody cases); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 13, § 722(a) (1997) (requiring court to consider all relevant factors bearing on
custody, including child's preference); D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-911 (a)(5) (1997) (requiring
court to consider all relevant factors where practicable in determining custody, including
child's wishes); Whaley v. Disbrow, 166 S.E.2d 343, 344 (Ga. 1969) (noting that for
children under 14 years of age, the court has wide discretion in awarding custody based
on any factors in the child's best interests); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 571-46(3) (Michie
1997) (providing that court will consider child's wishes regarding custody if child has
sufficient capacity and age); IDAHO CODE § 32-717 (West 1993) (providing that the court
may consider all relevant factors, including the child's wishes); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/602 (West 1996) (requiring court determination of custody according to the
child's best interests, including the child's preference as one factor of consideration);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-8 (West Supp. 1997) (requiring the court to determine custody
according to the best interests of the child, including consideration of the child's
wishes, with more consideration given to the child's wishes if the child is at least 14
years old); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3) (West 1993) (excluding from a determination of
the child's best interests consideration of the child's wishes); KAN. STAT. ANN. §
60-1610(a)(3)(B) (1994) (providing that the court should consider all relevant factors,
including the child's wishes); Burton v. Burton, 211 S.W. 869 (Ky. Ct. App. 1919)
(considering the wishes of a child who is of the age of discretion, but stating that those
wishes are not controlling on the court); Bowman v. Bowman, 233 S.W.2d 1020, 1022
(Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (holding that the wishes of the child were not necessarily binding
on the court); Haymes v. Haymes, 269 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954) (finding
that the wishes of the child were outweighed by the financial stability of the mother);
Shepherd v. Shepherd, 295 S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (holding that the
child's wishes were not dispositive, but could be given weight in the custody
determination); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. Art. 134 (West 1996) (requiring the court to
consider all factors relevant to the child's best interests, including the reasonable
preference of the child if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express a
preference); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19A § 1653(3) (West Supp. 1996) (requiring the
court to consider factors relevant to the child's best interests, including but not limited
to, the child's wishes); Bak v. Bak, 511 N.E.2d 625, 631 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987)
(reasoning that child's preference in custody proceedings is not to be given decisive
weight, but is a factor for the court to consider); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23,
722.25 (West 1993) (providing that in a custody dispute, a child's best interests control
and defining the best interests of child as including the reasonable preferences of the
child if of sufficient age); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.025 (West 1992) (providing that
custody be determined according to the best interests of child, including the child's
reasonable wishes if of sufficient age); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375(2) (Vernon 1997)
(including the wishes of the child in the best interests of child standard controlling a
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custody decision); MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212(2) (Smith 1997) (requiring courts

to decide custody according to the best interests of the child, including consideration of
the child's wishes); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-364(2) (1997) (providing that one factor in
the determination of custody is "the desires and wishes of the minor child if of an age of
comprehension regardless of chronological age, when such desires and wishes are based
on sound reasoning"); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.480(4) (1994) (providing that the "best
interests of child" control a custody decision and including as a factor of consideration
"the wishes of the child if the child is of sufficient age and capacity to form an
intelligent preference as to his custody"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458:1 7(VI) (1995)
(the court may take into consideration any preference shown by the child if the court
determines that it is in the best interest and welfare of the child); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
9:2-4(c) (West 1993) (requiring a child custody decision according to the best interests
of the child, including the preference of the child when of sufficient age and capacity to
reason so as to form an intelligent decision); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9(A) (Michie
1988) (directing the court to determine custody according to the best interests of the
child, including consideration of the child's wishes); Jones v. Payne, 493 N.Y.S.2d
650, 651 (3d Dep't. 1985) (holding that a child's desire to live with one parent over the
other was not exclusively determinative of the long-term best interests of the child);
Lyons v. Lyons, 490 N.Y.S.2d 871, 872 (2d Dep't 1985) (holding that a child's
preference to live with one parent over another was not a controlling factor in the
custody proceeding); Hinkle v. Hinkle, 146 S.E.2d 73, 79 (N.C. 1966) (explaining that
the court may consider the preference or wishes of a child of suitable age and discretion,
but the expressed wish of a child is never controlling upon the court); Campbell v.
Campbell, 304 S.E.2d 262, 264 (N.C. 1982) (holding that "while not controlling, the
judge may consider the preferences and wishes of the child to live with a particular
person"); In re Custody of Peal, 290 S.E.2d 664, 667 (N.C. 1982) (holding that the
judge may properly consider the preference or wishes of a child of suitable age and
discretion); Novak v. Novak, 441 N.W.2d 656, 658 (N.D. 1989) (holding that "the
child's preference is 'only one factor' to consider and is not usually determinative");
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (B)(1) (West 1992) (providing that the court shall take
into account that which would be in the best interest of the children, including, in
certain circumstances, the wishes of the child); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 21.1 (c)
(West 1988) (providing that "the court may consider the preference of the child in
awarding custody of [the] child if the child is of sufficient age to form an intelligent
preference"); Altus-Baumhor v. Baumhor, 595 A.2d 1147, 1150 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1991)
(stating that the child's preference must be considered, but is not controlling); Kenney
v. Hickey, 486 A.2d 1079, 1084 (R.I. 1985) (stating that the expressed preference is
not conclusive on the issue of what best promotes the child's welfare, but the preference
is competent and highly probative evidence on the particular issue); Smith v. Smith,
198 S.E.2d 271, 274 (S.C. 1973) (noting that "the significance to be attached to the
wishes of the child in a custody dispute depends upon the age of the child and the
attendant circumstances"); Jasper v. Jasper, 351 N.W.2d 114, 119 (S.D. 1984)
(allowing, but not requiring, consideration of the child's wishes if the child is of a
sufficient age to form an intelligent preference); Harris v. Harris, 832 S.W.2d 352, 354
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining that the court must consider the wishes of a child
over 14, but if the child is under 14, the court may consider the child's preference, but
need not do so); Bennett v. Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)
(holding that the child's preference for custody is only one of the factors to be
considered); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (1) (Supp. 1997) (allowing the court to consider
a child's preferences for custody, but providing that the preference is not controlling);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (Supp. 1997) (requiring a court to decide custody according
to the child's best interests, but not listing as a specific factor for consideration the
child's preference); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(7) (Supp. 1997) (stating that in a
custody determination according to the best interests of the child, the court should
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Opponents of the best interests standard may deem such an outcome
as an advancement of the law: the more cases decided in accordance
with what children want, the better. However, advocates who favor
increasing the probability of cases decided on the basis of controlling
substantive principles, (something that courts and legislatures
inherently should prefer) ought to carefully consider whether they
want to provide Robert with a lawyer.
In contested custody proceedings, children have been purposely
disempowered from choosing the parent with whom they want to live.
Although a child's preference is to be made known to the judge, it is
fully consistent with a child's right to require that the child live with
the parent the judge believes is best for the child, even when the child
disagrees. The scope of a child's substantive rights in a given area of
the law defines a child's rights. This definition, in turn, not only
impacts the role of counsel for young children in that area, it also
directly implicates the need for counsel in the first place.
consider "the reasonable preference of the child, if the court deems the child to be of
reasonable intelligence, understanding, age and experience to express such a
preference"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.187(3)(a)(vi) (West 1997) (listing as a
factor for consideration the wishes of a child who is sufficiently mature to express
reasoned and independent preferences); Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W.Va.
1981) (stating that "[wihere a child is old enough to formulate an opinion about his or
her own custody the trial court is entitled to receive such opinion and accord it such
weight as he feels appropriate"); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(5)(b) (West 1993) (requiring
the court to consider all facts relevant to custody, including the wishes of the child);
Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 429 (Wyo. 1985) (explaining that "the children's
wishes are only one factor for the court to consider when awarding custody"); Douglas v.
Sheffner, 331 P.2d 840, 844 (Wyo. 1958) (stating that although a court may consider a
child's preference for custody determination, those wishes are not conclusive).
Moreover, in the custody proceedings of most jurisdictions, even lawyers representing
impaired children are obliged to express the wishes of their clients to the court. This is
so because the substantive rules of custody cases that authorize courts to take into
account the preferences of children make no distinction among children based on
"impairment."
Presumably judges choose to give less weight to the preferences of
impaired children (usually meaning younger children but perhaps including older
children whom the judge believes were unduly influenced by one parent) than they give
to unimpaired children. However, under current substantive law, impaired children have
a right to make their views known to the judge. It is inconceivable that children would
have their rights limited or curtailed as a result of being provided with counsel. Because
judges also consider the wishes of "impaired" children, lawyers must not silence or
distort their clients wishes.
In a very few jurisdictions, the preferences of children over a particular age are
dispositive of the custody dispute. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 9-103 (1994)
(providing that a child of age 16 or older may designate which parent to live with); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-1 1-65 (Supp. 1997) (providing that if both parents are fit and "it would
be to the best interest and welfare of the children, then any such child who shall have
reached his twelfth birthday shall have the privilege of choosing the parent with whom
he shall live").
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B. What Can Now Be Expectedfrom a Lawyer Representing an
Average Ten-Year-Old in a Contested Child ProtectionProceeding
Just as empowering a child to set the objectives in a custody case
can subvert substantive law, the same holds true in child protection
proceedings. Because the substantive law fails to take into account the
child's views in determining whether the child has been abused or
neglected, it is legally irrelevant whether or not a child desires the court
to enter an order declaring the child neglected or not neglected.
Commonly, children who require protection are forcibly removed from
their parents' custody, even when the children prefer remaining at
home. At the same time, when a child's parents have not been abusive
or neglectful, the child is legally obligated to live with them, regardless
of the child's preferences."8
The organized Bar, however, now insists that children, whenever
feasible, be empowered to set objectives that their lawyers must
zealously seek to obtain.' 8' In other words, it is quite likely that
providing children with aggressive lawyers who will attempt to tilt the
outcome of the case in the direction of the child's wishes will make 8it2
less likely, not more likely, that the "correct" legal result be reached.
If this concept is new to judges, it has been fully appreciated by
various children's advocates over the years. It is easy to describe the
modus operandi of these advocates. These advocates seek indirectly to
effect changes in substantive law by advocating for increased
procedural rights of children. In particular, when advocates are
displeased with certain substantive principles used to decide children's
issues, they turn to the apparently more neutral procedural claim of a
"child's right to be heard."
A good example of this is found in the area of foster care. In this
area, many children's rights advocates have expressed displeasure
over the court's consistent failure to recognize a child's substantive
due process right to remain with a long-time foster parent with whom
the child has developed a significantly equivalent parent-child
relationship.' 83 These child advocates lament the substantive rule that
foster children do not ordinarily have a constitutionally protected
liberty interest to remain with long-term foster parents. 8" In recent
180. See N.Y.F.C.A. § 1012(e), (f) (McKinney's 1984).
181. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
182. The use of the term "correct result" in this context signifies the result that is
most consistent with controlling substantive principles.
183. See Child v. Beame, 412 F. Supp. 593, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (holding that a
permanent stable home is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right).
184. See, e.g., Kyees v. County Dep't of Pub. Welfare of Tippecanoe County, 600
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years, many children's rights advocates left with few places to turn to
change this substantive rule have sought to provide children with a
certain kind of counsel in foster care proceedings.a' Under the guise
of procedural due process, these advocates argue for a child's right to
be heard and represented, disguising their hidden agenda of changing
substantive due process law already established by courts and
legislatures.
In many states, the substantive law of foster care and termination of
parental rights is well settled. In most jurisdictions, whether a child
enters the foster care system through a voluntary placement or a
judicial finding of parental abuse or neglect, the child must be returned
to the parents' custody under certain circumstances. When the
placement is voluntarily made, it is revocable by the parent at will.
When an agency receives a revocation notice, it must either return the
child or obtain a court order that finds returning the child to the parents
contrary to the child's best interests."
Many states will not terminate parents' parental rights even when
children have been in foster care for a number of years unless the state
agency can prove by clear and convincing evidence,' 87 that meaningful
efforts were made to reunite the child with the parent or that the agency
was justified in not making such efforts.lm In basic form, this is also
the law in Florida. A petition to terminate the rights of a parent whose
child has been in long-term foster care will falter upon a showing that
F.2d 693, 697-99 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that the relationship between a child and
foster parents did not create a liberty interest); Drummond v. Fulton County Dep't of
Family & Children's Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1206-09 (5th Cir. 1977) (holding that a
hearing prior to a child's removal from a foster home was not constitutionally required).
185. See Christina Dugger Sommer, Note, Empowering Children: Granting Foster
Children the Right to Initiate Parental Rights Termination Proceedings,79 CORNELL L.
REV. 1200 (1994).
186. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 672(f), (g) (Supp. 1997).
187. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 748 (1982).
188. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(1); 675(5)(A), (B) (Supp. 1997). This federal provision
has been codified in many States. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 232(a)(7) (West Supp.
1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-717(i) (West Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38 1583(b)(7) (1993); N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW §§ 384-b(7)(a), (8)(a)(ii), (8)(b)(ii)
(McKinney's Supp. 1997-98); OR. REV. STAT. § 419.523(2)(e) (1987); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
15-7-7 (1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.415(2)(b) (West 1997). See also In re Derek W.
Burns, 519 A.2d 638 (Del. 1986) (holding that the state is obligated to preserve the
family unit when feasible and must make efforts at reunification prior to termination); In
re Sheila G., 462 N.E.2d 1139 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that only after the agency has
proved by clear and convincing evidence that it has fulfilled its statutory duty to attempt
to reunite the family may the court consider whether a parent has fulfilled his or her
duties); In re William, 448 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1982) (holding that the state agency is
obliged to do everything in its power to assist a family before termination will be
permitted).
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the agency failed to perform or improperly performed its duties to help
reunify the family.' 89 This substantive rule, which is the product of
legislative judgment attempting to balance the rights of foster families,
natural parents, and children, especially poor children who are
disproportionately subjected to placement in foster care, strikes certain
child advocates as unwise and unfair public policy."9 According to
these advocates, children ought to have the right to insist on remaining
in a foster parent's home after having lived there for a certain period of
time. As such, these advocates believe that the law discussed above
violates a child's right to self determination.
One such advocate is George Russ, the adoptive father of Gregory
K., an eleven-year-old Florida foster child whose efforts to have his
mother's parental rights terminated caused a sensation several years
ago. 9 ' Gregory first entered foster care at the age of nine, when his
mother voluntarily placed him in foster care. After about one year, he
returned to his mother's home where he remained for less than three
months before being readmitted to foster care.'
Shortly thereafter, Gregory's mother executed a Performance
Agreement with Florida's Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("DHRS"). Less than two years after Gregory's reentrance
into foster care, DHRS concluded that Gregory's mother satisfactorily
complied with the Performance Agreement, and deemed it safe to
return Gregory to his mother's care. By the time DHRS made this
decision, however, Gregory was living with a foster family, the
Russes, who promised to adopt Gregory if he so desired. Before
DHRS sent Gregory back to live with his mother, the foster parents
arranged for Gregory to retain his own lawyer, who promptly
petitioned the court, seeking an order that would permanently severe
his legal relationship with his mother and allow the Russes to adopt

189. See, e.g., Williams ,. Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services, 482
So.2d 1371 (Fla. 1986) (requiring a performance plan or agreement as a precondition to
initiation of termination proceedings); Burk v. Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services, 476 So.2d 1275 (Fla. 1985) (holding that before termination of parental
rights may be ordered, the agency must first offer the abusing parent a performance
agreement which allows him or her an opportunity to eliminate the conditions that
caused the abuse).
190. See, e.g., Woodhouse, supra note 65, at 326-27.
191. See Kingsley v. Kingsley, 623 So.2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993); William
Booth, Tangled Family Ties and Children's Rights: Teen's Change of Mind Revives
Debate, WASH. POST, March 11, 1994, at A3; Jeff Kunerth, Gregory K. Ruling Evokes
Outrage, Praise,Disappointment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, August 20, 1993, at B I, available
in 1993 WL 5755043; Child 'Divorce' Upheld, NEWSDAY, August 20, 1993, at 16.
192. See Russ, supra note 66, at 367.
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him. 193
Florida law provides that families with children in foster care have
the substantive right to reunification services.' 94 This law is based on
the fundamental concept that children are best served by being raised
by their families and the state owes children the duty of using its
resources to reunite children with their families whenever such
reunification can be accomplished without endangering the health or
safety of a child. 95 Under Florida law, it is quite clear that children do
not have the substantive right to choose who will raise them, nor do
they have the substantive right to refuse a judicial order to live with
their parent.'96
Nonetheless, according to Russ, children ought to have a right to
representation in termination proceedings by a lawyer who will
forcefully argue for the result the child seeks. 9 7 However, by
articulating this view, Russ appears to undermine the substantive law,
which he regards as ill-advised and violative of a child's substantive
rights. In other words, he is actually advancing his own substantive
agenda of making it possible for a child's preference to become a
prominent factor in termination proceedings. The more that children
are represented by forceful advocates, the more cases involving
children who want to be adopted will result in terminations. Until the
substantive law is modified to allow for consideration of the child's
desire, however, a different justification is needed for insisting that
children be represented other than that children have a right to have
their views forcefully presented in court.
Perhaps young children should be empowered with self
determination in many areas of the law than the law currently allows.
Perhaps, for example, children should be empowered to have their
preferences serve as the deciding factor regarding whether their parents
should be declared unfit in child protection proceedings, or whether
children should be placed in foster care, permitted to remain in foster
care, or freed for adoption. Perhaps, too, in contested custody
proceedings, children should be empowered to choose which parent
with whom they want to reside. But, if these changes take place, the
substantive law should change before the role of counsel changes.
Even more significantly, it is important to keep an eye on the impact
of substantive law when children are provided representation. The
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See
See
See
See
See

id. at
supra
supra
supra
Russ,

367-68.
note 189 and accompanying text.
note 189 and accompanying text.
note 189 and accompanying text.
supra note 66, at 378-80.
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court-assigned lawyer for a ten-year-old foster child, such as Gregory
K., will forcefully seek to have the court terminate parental rights for
no other reason than the fact that the client wants the lawyer to do so.
When this happens, the preferences of the ten-year-old will be given
more weight, through the indirect route of the lawyer's strong
advocacy, than the law intends children to have. Given this, courts
and legislators may not want to unleash a forceful advocate to
undertake this role.
C. What We May Now Expect from a Lawyer Representing a Very
Young Child in a Contested Custody Case or a Child Protection
Proceeding
Judges may prefer that a lawyer represent a young child for a variety
of reasons. One reason commonly is the judge's desire to obtain a
recommendation from the lawyer to assist the judge when making the
ultimate determination in the case. For better or worse, judges must
now begin to recognize that lawyers representing children will begin
refusing to make such recommendations. Instead, judges should now
begin to expect lawyers to disagree with them about their role and
explicitly refuse to recommend a particular result.
For example, when asked to give a closing statement at the end of a
contested custody proceeding on behalf of a five-year-old child, an
increasing number of lawyers will now refuse to advocate any result.
Judges should begin to expect the following response:
After considering all of the evidence, I leave it to Your
Honor to decide which parent best meets the child's best
interests. I have reflected carefully on the utility of my sharing
with Your Honor my own sense of which outcome would best
serve my client and I have respectfully concluded that it could
not conceivably be of value. When Your Honor asks me to
tell the court what I think it should do, I must decline on the
grounds that I would be performing an injustice both to the
court and to my client.
It is my professional judgment that I fully discharge my
responsibilities both to the court and to my client by ensuring
that all of the factors that went into the decision are placed on
the record and that all of the facts that a thorough, responsible
decision-maker would want to know have been made available
to the decision-maker. I believe I have accomplished that.
Through my involvement the court has been placed in a ideal
decision to decide the case.
My own view regarding how the court should decide the
case cannot help but contaminate the record. I acknowledge
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having views on the best outcome in this case. I hope the
court will forgive me for doing everything within my power to
ensure that those views remain hidden from view, not only in
the sense that Your Honor will not be able to discern them
from my remarks today, but at the deeper level that they have
not influenced my remarks. Although I have formed opinions
in this case, I cannot conclude that those opinions would
necessarily be shared by all members of the Bar. I can well
conceive that had the court appointed an equally qualified
different member of the Bar in my place, that individual could
responsibly have reached a different view of this case than I
happened to have reached.
That led me to think more deeply about the correctness of
my role in this case. In reflecting on that further, I realized
that I would be rather upset if this other lawyer were now
given the privilege of addressing this Court and telling this
Court how to decide this case. I would be upset for two
reasons. First, the lawyer would purportedly be speaking on
behalf of the child. And I am keenly aware that fiction does
not ring true. Second, and related to the first, I would not
agree with the recommendations being made.
If I would be upset were a different member of the Bar
arguing for a particular outcome in this case, then I should not
permit myself the extraordinary power of arguing for any
outcome. I recognize that I might feel differently if I believed
all lawyers would advocate the same result that I prefer. But
as I have already said, I do not believe that in this case.
(Moreover, in the peculiar circumstance in which all lawyers
invariably would recommend the identical result, it seems
highly improbable that the court would need such advice in the
first place. In those cases in which the correct result is so
obvious that all lawyers would reach it, I cannot imagine any
circumstances in which the court would somehow reach a
contrary result.)
But I speak this way not only to emphasize the sense of
unfairness I think allowing me to make a recommendation
would cause, I have also reflected on how I can be of most use
to Your Honor. Since we do not know each other nearly well
enough for you to know my personal values or biases, and
since there would be no way for you to conclude confidently
that I did not rely on them (either explicitly or unconsciously)
in making whatever recommendation I chose to make, I have
come to appreciate that my particular recommendation would
not place Your Honor in nearly as helpful a position as my
choosing simply to remind you of all of the relevant facts and
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legal principles involved here and leaving to you the difficult
task of reaching a decision.
If my own views were interjected into the record, I would
have failed in the first mission I set out to accomplish: to place
on the record all of the factors that went into the decision.
Many factors that went into my personal view on the outcome
invariably will be excluded from the record. Additionally, you
may inadvertently give more weight to my views than you
should. You may confuse my views with what is best for the
child or as an expression of the child's views. They are
neither.
I trust I have helped you perform your job to the best of
my ability. I believe I have made a very important contribution
to the case. You are now in an ideal position to make your
decision. There is nothing further I can do to help you decide
it that would not, in my opinion, distract from my work
already. I respectfully decline to do more.
When attorneys representing very young children give such a
closing statement, courts should be pleased for at least two reasons.
First, in cases involving children too young to express a preference,
such a closing statement eliminates the danger that the lawyer's
advocacy is the product of his or her own personal values. Second,
when young children have a preference about the outcome, a closing
statement such as this eliminates the concern that the lawyer's
advocacy will simply be a disguised application of the child's
preferences.
On the other hand, if courts continue to expect lawyers to advocate
for a result, it is likely that lawyers seeking to adhere faithfully to the
Bar's consensus on the lawyer's role will begin, more and more, to
advocate for the result desired even by their very young client. This
advocacy is likely because the basic principle of the consensus was to
eliminate the danger that lawyers would seek different results in like
cases based on the personalities and values of the randomly assigned
lawyers.'98 One way to avoid this danger is to avoid advocating for
any result. But, if courts insist that lawyers advocate for a particular
result, lawyers who are unwilling to disobey the court and unwilling to
inject their own values into the proceedings will naturally look to some
source for guidance in determining what result to ask the court to
reach. For many of these lawyers, the only available source will be
their client's preferences, however young the children may be.
When this occurs, courts will eventually be unable to discern when:
198.

See supra Part III.A.
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the lawyer is arguing for a particular result because the lawyer
"believes" the result is best for the client, or only derivatively because
the client wants such a result. Good lawyers will mask reliance on the
client's preferences before courts known not to give much weight to a
child's preferences. As Jean Koh Peters has sagely advised children's
advocates, once lawyers know their client's wishes, it is strategically
sound for the lawyers to "translate" the legal argument into the "best
interests" language so that judges will be more likely to decide the
matter in accordance to the child's wishes."9
Whether or not courts will be pleased with this new form of
advocacy, they should begin to become accustomed to it. Indeed,
legislatures and courts should now reexamine the economics of
appointing counsel in all cases involving impaired children. Once
attorneys for impaired children stop advocating an outcome, they
become a type of procedural grease, principally concerned with
making sure that the child receives all the appropriate procedural
protection. While some situations may still justify the appointment of
an attorney to assure these protections, in many cases, the judge, along
with counsel for the two competing parties, could just as effectively
safeguard the rights of the child. 2" By not appointing attorneys in
situations where their role could be filled by the other mechanisms of
the court such as the judge or an independent investigating agency,
there should be a substantial savings to the parties or the state. 20 1

199. See Peters, supra note 64, at 1515.
200. In particular, when children enter the state's care, as, for example, when
children become foster children, it plainly makes sense to provide them with an attorney
to protect their legal interests while they are state wards.
201. Furthermore, the routine addition of representatives for children may delay the
proceedings and tax the resources both of the parties and the courts. Adding a lawyer or
guardian ad litem not only increases fees; but also overall costs may become
geometrically greater if the child's representative wishes to retain paid experts whose
contributions may, in turn, encourage the parties to retain additional experts. These
greater expenses may ultimately be detrimental to the child's interests, since less money
will be available after the divorce (and during its pendency) to spend on the child. If the
child's representative is paid by the county, taxpayers will be subsidizing private
parties engaged in a private legal dispute; in the absence of allegations that the child has
suffered serious risk of harm that rises to the level of abuse or neglect, this would appear
to be a misuse of public money. If representatives for children are unpaid, there will be
an insufficient number of qualified professionals routinely available to represent
children. See generally ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS
OF CHILDREN AND THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICAN'S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA

FOR LEGAL ACTION 3-8 (1993) (discussing ABA recommendation that attorneys volunteer

to represent children).
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VI. CONCLUSION

In light of the expected role attorneys for children will assume,
judges must carefully weigh the costs of appointing an attorney in each
situation. In many child custody proceedings, the appointment of an
attorney for the child may actually undermine the substantive law. In
child protection proceedings, courts must pay closer attention to the
expectations of lawyers for children. Now is an opportune time for
legislatures and judges to redefine and limit the scope of the right to
counsel for children to include only those situations where the attorney
will further the interests of the child without the incidental cost of
subverting substantive law.

